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This dissertation examines the uctuations of the aggregate economy when frictions in
nancial markets are present. I focus on the the asymmetric information problems between
creditors and debtors on the quality of debtor's projects and I analyze how these frictions
cause the uctuations in aggregate economy which is potentially inefcient.
The rst chapter examines the interaction between the perverse incentives and the gen-
eral equilibrium effects of misallocated bank credit. This essay is intended to elucidate the
mechanism of zombie lending in Japan. By incorporating a soft budget problem into a neo-
classical dynamic general equilibrium model, the model shows that an inefcient zombie
lending regime can be selected as an equilibrium. In this equilibrium, the incentives and
the general equilibrium effects are interdependent. The inefcient use of resources crowds
out investment when banks have incentives to bail out insolvent rms. On the other hand,
the general equilibrium effects give rise to the perverse incentives endogenously through
the formation of the liquidation value and the continuation value of insolvent rms. In the
worst case, agents fail to resolve non-performing loan problems, and the model economy
permanently falls into an inefcient regime.
The second chapter proposes a model that generate boom-and-bust cycles by securi-
tization of subprime mortgages. I construct a dynamic housing choice model in which
mortgages are nanced by securitization and I assume that creditors have errors in measur-
ing the default risks of subprime mortgages. With this setup, the resource availability for
housing uctuates endogenously and it causes the boom-and-bust cycles. Particularly, there
are two channels that change the resource availability: the security design of the securitized
assets and the evolution of house price ination. I illustrate that subprime mortgages can be
cheaply nanced by securitization when creditors mismeasure the quality of the subprime
mortgages. This ignites a boom in the model. However, the boom can be terminated as the
protability of securitization declines along with the decline in the expectation of house
price ination. This is because the house price ination is tied with the liquidation value
of the defaulted mortgages. As the expectation of the house price ination slows down,
the subprime mortgages become more risky and the securitization becomes less protable.
Eventually, issuers of securitized assets withdraw from the securitization market and the
boom collapses.
The last chapter explores the transmission mechanisms of international business cycles
when the borrowing capacity of multinational enterprises (MNEs) is limited. I embed
MNEs that face borrowing constraints in a two-country international business cycle model.
I show that the net worth of MNEs plays a signicant role in generating the international
business cycle co-movement: the wealth effect in response to the change in MNEs' net
worth has a strong multiplier effect on domestic and foreign investment of MNEs. Output
moves in the same direction between the two countries due to the synchronized investment.
The model is also able to generate reasonable cross-country correlations in real estate price
and consumption.
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Chapter 1
Incentives and Macroeconomic Effects
of Zombie Lending in Japan
1.1 Introduction
This paper examines the perverse incentives of misallocated bank credit and its macro-
economic effects during the 1990s in Japan. The focus of this paper is the dynamic in-
teraction between banks' incentives and the depressing macroeconomic effects of zombie
lending. Here, I dene zombie lending as the bailout of insolvent rms by extending ad-
ditional credit. In the model, the incentives and the general equilibrium effects affect one
another. Additionally, this interaction creates a coordination failure problem among savers,
borrowers and nancial intermediaries in resolving issues involving non-performing loans.
I show that this coordination failure can induce the economy to select an inefcient zombie
lending regime.
It has been widely argued that the prevalence of zombie lending is among the ma-
jor causes of the decade-long economic downturn in Japan. Hoshi and Kashyap (2004,
2005) hypothesize that zombie lending caused the prolonged recession in Japan in the
1990s. Peek and Rosengren (2005) and Sekine, Kobayashi and Saita (2003) nd evi-
dence that is consistent with zombie lending. Moreover, Caballero, Hoshi and Kashap
(2008), Barseghyan (2008) and Dekle and Kletzer (2005) develop theoretical foundations
of depressive effects of zombie lending on businesses and economic growth. However,
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we still lack formal studies on the interaction between the incentives and the effects of
zombie lending. The model in this paper addresses the following questions jointly: why
do banks repeatedly bail out insolvent rms? How do the incentives for banks affect the
performance of the Japanese economy? Does the poor performance of Japan's economy
aggravate banks' incentives to rescue insolvent rms?
To answer these questions, I utilize the studies of soft budget constraints developed by
Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) and Berglöf and Roland (1997, 1998) and others. The
advantage of utilizing soft budget constraints is that the concept of soft budget constraints
matches that of zombie lending and highlights the perverse incentives for banks to rescue
insolvent rms.1 The setup of soft budget constraints consist of lenders, good borrowers
and poor borrowers. Poor borrowers have incentives to divert borrowing to enjoy private
benets, and lenders are incapable of distinguishing poor borrowers from good borrowers.
If poor borrowers divert, they ask the lenders to renance their projects. The key in this
problem is that ex ante and ex post incentives for lenders are different due to the sunk nature
of initial lending. If the liquidation value of the borrowers is small and the continuation
value for which lenders do not consider the cost of initial lending is large, lenders ultimately
renance the debt of poor borrowers. Taking this into account, poor borrowers safely enjoy
private benets. This moral hazard problem is the essence of soft budget constraints.
The novelty of this paper is to incorporate the structure of soft budget constraints into
a neoclassical-style dynamic general equilibrium model. This framework enables us to ex-
amine the interaction between the incentives and the general equilibrium effects of zombie
lending. I endogenize the liquidation value and the continuation value of insolvent rms,
thereby linking the outcome of general equilibrium with the incentives of bailout. The liq-
uidation value consists of the value of land that borrowers own. This specication is used
to follow banking practices in Japan, in which land is the chief means of collateral.
1Although the soft budget constraint was originally designed to examine the perverse incentives on credit
allocation in socialist countries and transition economies, it can be applied to bad-loan problems in Japan.
For example, see Hosono and Sakuragawa (2003).
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I show that the lack of coordination among banks, savers and borrowers in resolving
non-performing loan problems causes the economy to select inefcient renancing equilib-
rium. To get an intuition, suppose that households (savers) and rm owners (borrowers, but
land providers at the same time) anticipate that banks will renance non-performing loans.
The non-performing loans reduce the rates of return due to the inefcient use of saving.
Households are thus discouraged from saving, and the capital stock declines. Firm owners
lower the valuation of land due to the complementarity of land and capital. On the other
hand, the collective behavior of households and rm owners forms the liquidation value
and the continuation value of insolvent rms. These values can be consistent with banks'
incentives to rescue insolvent rms. As a result, households' and rm owners' suppositions
are valid, and the economy as a whole selects the inefcient zombie lending regime. This
phenomenon is similar to the prisoner's dilemma in the sense the lack of cooperation to
ght against low-return outcomes forces the agents to select low-return outcomes.
This paper is closely related to the theoretical studies of zombie lending conducted by
Caballero, Hoshi and Kashayp (2008), Barseghyan (2008) and Dekle and Kletzer (2005).
Caballero et al. (2008) point out that keeping unproductive rms alive creates conges-
tion effects; costs of production rise because unprotable rms, who normally exit from
markets, soak up resources. Then productive rms reduce new businesses creation and in-
crease existing businesses destruction which are inefcient. Barseghyan (2008) and Dekle
and Kletzer (2005) yield qualitatively similar results. Their models predict that bailouts
of banks crowd out investment because the government soaks up saving to bail out the
banks. Effectively, my model yields the crowding out effect on investment. In this sense,
the macroeconomic effects of zombie lending in this paper are not much different from
those of the previous works. However, this paper goes one step further by endogenizing
the incentives of the bailout.2 The incentives and the general equilibrium effects are inter-
2To my knowledge, only Brandt and Zhu (2001) have utilized a soft budget constraint in a macroeconomic
model. Their objective is to examine the macroeconomic effects of the incentive for the Chinese government
to keep state-owned rms alive. However, they assume that the value of renancing state-owned rms is large
enough. In this sense, the emergence of a soft budget constraint is fated in their model.
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dependent in my model; zombie lending raises loan interest rates due to the risk premium
of loans, and it generates crowding-out effects on investment. At the same time, the allo-
cation of resources and prices support the incentives of zombie lending. This paper shows
that the interaction between the incentives and the general equilibrium effects can induce
the economy to select an inefcient renancing regime as an equilibrium.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 presents an overview of the zombie
lending in Japan to set the context for this paper. Section 1.3 builds up the model. I de-
scribe the nancial contract and the dynamic general equilibrium sequentially. Section 1.4
presents the main results of this paper. I present the dynamic properties of the model, the
sources of inefciencies in the zombie lending regime and a simulation result in that sec-
tion. Section 1.5 conducts some policy analyses to show the desirable policy for restoring
efciency. Finally, section 1.6 concludes this paper.
1.2 An overview of zombie lending in Japan
During the 1990s, when Japan faced the so called "lost decade," the Japanese banking
sector faced a rising amount of non-performing loans; the overall macroeconomic condi-
tion deteriorated in this decade, causing record numbers of borrowers becoming insolvent.
Eventually, banks responded to this challenge by engaging in bailouts of insolvent rms,
which is called zombie lending. According to Caballero, Hoshi and Kashyap (2008), the
share of rms that received interest concessions from banks suddenly increased at the be-
ginning of the 1990s and remained large throughout the decade.3 Peek and Rosengren
(2005) nd that the likelihood that a rm obtains additional credit from a bank increases as
the protability of the rm deteriorates. They call it a perverse incentive of credit.
Sudden and large fall of commercial land prices at the onset of the 1990s is a factor
3Caballero et al. (2008) dene zombie lending as the loans for which implied ex post loan interest rates,
which are calculated from actual loan repayments, are lower than the minimum required interest rate, which
is calculated from public data. The measure may not cover all of the bailout, as there would be other forms
of bailout than interest concessions.
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that triggered zombie lending. Commercial land was the main form of collateral of the
bank loans at that time. In this economic environment, banks had trouble writing off non-
performing loans: The low value of collateral would have signicantly impaired the banks'
capital if they had written off the non-performing loans. The effects of the plunge of com-
mercial land prices were pronounced due to the fact that banks increased lending to the
real estate sector during the 1980s, where it heavily utilized land as collateral (See Ueda
(2001)). Eventually, banks extended additional credit to insolvent rms to keep them alive
in the hope that these rms would recover. Ogawa and Kitasaka (2001) nd evidence that
is consistent with this view. They estimate the loan supply function of the Japanese banks
and nd that the change in land price has a positive and signicant effect on the loan supply
during the late 1980s. More interestingly, the effect becomes ambiguous after 1990. This
is consistent with zombie lending; banks did not respond to the plunge of the value of main
collateral in a systematic way. Some banks actually increased loan supplies, which may be
due to zombie lending.
Another factor that contributed to zombie lending is so-called regulatory forbearance.
Hoshi and Kashyap (2004, 2005) and Hosono and Sakuragawa (2003) point out that the
loose standards of bank supervision caused and enabled banks to hide non-performing
loans. Although the Japanese government followed the BIS standard on bank capital re-
quirements, the government did not actively inspect the quality of the loan portfolios of the
Japanese banks. In this circumstance, banks had incentives to hide non-performing loans to
meet the capital requirements. Ultimately, banks disguised non-performing loans as good
loans by extending additional credit to insolvent rms. This structure implies that the gov-
ernment bailed out banks because these loans were generating losses and were eventually
rescued by deposit insurance. The deposit insurance in Japan guaranteed the full amount
of deposits at that time.
Although there is plenty of evidence about zombie lending, its contribution to the
macroeconomic condition is not so conclusive. First of all, zombie lending alone can-
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not fully account for the stagnation of the Japanese economy. The structural reduction
of work hours enforced by a government regulation apparently contributed to the fall of
output.4 Moreover, Hayashi and Prescott (2002) argue that the nancial breakdown was
not a source of the economic downturn in Japan. Instead, they claim that the decline of
total factor productivity (TFP) was the fundamental source. However, they remark that the
nancial distress might have caused the deterioration in their measure of TFP. Moreover,
the way in which they measure the TFP, which is simple growth accounting, is too naive to
support their points. A more rigid estimate of the TFP by Kawamoto (2005) nds that the
growth of TFP did not slow down during the 1990s. More recent studies that utilize micro
data suggest that zombie lending had signicant effects on economic activities. For exam-
ple, Caballero, Hoshi and Kashyap (2008) nd evidence of congestion effects caused by
zombie lending. They nd that the level of investment and the growth in the employment
of healthy rms decline in industries in which the share of zombie lending is large. To this
end, it would be safe to say that zombie lending had at least some impact on the condition
of the overall economy.
1.3 The model
This section presents the building blocks of the model to analyze the interaction be-
tween the incentives and the macroeconomic effects of zombie lending. The model has
two ingredients, one-shot nancial contracts and dynamic consumption-saving decisions.
A simplied version of soft budget constraints (hereafter SBC) characterizes the nancial
contracts. Dynamic optimization is taken from neoclassical-style dynamic general equilib-
riummodels. As we see later, the interaction between the outcome of the nancial contracts
and the dynamic optimization creates rich implications for the selection of equilibria.
In the model, a rm owner appoints a project manager who is the unique agent for
4Christiano and Fujiwara (2006) examine the general equilibrium effects of the structural work-hour re-
duction in the 1990s together with the economic boom in preceding years.
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managing production. I dene a rm as a composite of a rm owner and a project man-
ager. Banks and rms are involved in the nancial contracts. The outcome of the nancial
contracts is either a hard or a soft budget constraint. SBC results in bailouts of insolvent
rms by banks, which matches the concept of zombie lending. Finally, households and
rm owners make dynamic consumption-saving choices given the outcome of the nancial
contracts.
1.3.1 Financial contracts
A rm makes a nancial contract with a bank. Before the arrangement of the nancial
contract, a rm owner appoints a project manager who is the unique agent for implementing
production in the model. There are two types of project managers. One is good and the
other is poor. The total population of rm managers is a unit mass and the share of good
managers is xed to  2 [0; 1] at all periods. I assume that banks as well as rm owners
cannot distinguish poor managers from good managers ex ante. Because a rm owner and
a project manager are tied with a one-to-one relationship, I characterize a nancial contract
as an arrangement between a bank and a project manager (either good or poor). In the
contracts, banks are lenders, while project managers are borrowers. All project managers
die after the contracts end. I shall use "he" as a pronoun to indicate a bank and "she" to
indicate a project manager (either good or poor) in order to avoid confusion.
All managers have two technologies: they convert the borrowing from banks into capi-
tal, and then they produce the consumption good by combining capital and other resources,
which households and rm owners provide directly. The problem in this contract is that
poor managers potentially divert a part of initial borrowings to enjoy private benets. The
capacity of the diversion is denoted by  2 [0; 1], that is, poor managers can divert  units
of consumption good per unit of initial borrowing. In cases where a poor manager diverts,
she asks the bank for additional credit to complete the project.5
5An implicit assumption is that the diversion alone is not sufcient for poor managers to enjoy private
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・Banks collect deposit (d)
  from households and lend
  it to managers (L0)
・Good managers immediately
  start production using labor
  (n), capital (k) and land (m)
・Poor managers decide
  whether divert or not.
・Banks observe the type of
  each managers.
・If poor managers divert,
  banks make decision on
  continuation of poor
  manager's project.
  Liquidation     Refinancing
  Squeeze firm   Project continues
  owner's land
・Production completes.
  y = f(n,k,m)
・Loan repayment by managers.
・Banks pay off deposit.
・Payoff of each agent realizes.
end of time-t beginning of time-t+1
Figure 1-1: Flow of events in the nancial contract
Good managers
Good managers act in good faith, and they start production as soon as they get nanced
from banks.6 The production technologies of good managers are summarized below:
capital creation: L0 = k;
consumption good production: y = A(n)n(k)k(m)1 n k :
The rst line describes the capital creation function. Good managers convert borrow-
ings into capital in one-to-one relation. The second line describes the production function
of the consumption good: it is a Cobb-Douglas function of labor (n), capital (k) and land
(m), and it has a constant return to scale property. A is the total factor productivity. n and
k are the labor share and the capital share, respectively. Good managers hire labor from
the labor market where households are the suppliers of labor. A rm owner directly supplies
benets. Survival until the end of the period and repaying the contractual return to banks is necessary to
enjoy private benets.
6Alternatively, we can assume that good managers are not endowed with the capacity for diversion. In
this case, the good managers have no choice but to behave even if they want to enjoy private benets as poor
managers.
8
land to a project manager when the rm owner appoint the project manager. Households
and rm owners are not actively involved in the nancial contracts.
Poor managers
Poor managers are endowed with the capacity to divert a part of their initial borrowings,
and their objective is to pursue private benets by the diversion: poor managers can divert
borrowing by  2 [0; 1] per unit of initial borrowing. They can convert it to private benets
if they obtain renancing and keep their positions in the rms until the end of the nancial
contracts. The private benets are proportional to the amount of diversion, L0. However,
poor managers are not able to enjoy the private benets if they lose their positions due to the
liquidation of rms. Moreover, poor managers expense costs in this case, which is propor-
tional to the amount of the diversion. This can be interpreted as, for example, legal costs
brought about by a lawsuit for misappropriation. Poor managers have an outside option
to prevent losses from unsuccessful diversions. The outside option is to begin production
immediately after they get their initial borrowings. I assume that poor managers have the
same technologies as good managers but that poor managers do not obtain private benets
by engaging in production.7
Poor managers' initial choice is whether to try to divert or not. Their payoff is described
as follows:
PB =
8>>>><>>>>:
 L0 if a poor manager diverts and the bank renances
0 if a poor manager decides to produce immediately
  L0 if a poor manager diverts but the bank does not renance
9>>>>=>>>>; :
I assume that the private benet is proportional to the amount of diversion, L0, if it is
successful.  is the coefcient that controls the magnitude of the benet. I assume that  
7It would be feasible to assume that poor managers' technologies are inferior to those of good managers.
However, the poor managers' incentives to divert rather than the technologies are what cause inefciencies in
my model. As a result, the difference in the technologies is non-essential.
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is small so that the social planner will not prefer poor managers to divert in equilibrium.
As noted above, their private benet becomes negative if they fail to divert. This type of
preference ranking is frequently assumed in SBC literatures. This also implies that poor
managers conduct diversions only if renancing is credible. It is ideal for banks to commit
to liquidate poor managers' projects if they ask renancing. However, I will show that such
a commitment is not credible under certain conditions. I assume that poor managers are no
longer capable of diversion after obtaining renancing. Thus, poor managers nally start
production after they obtain renancing.
Banks
Banks collect deposits from households (which I introduce later) and lend them to
project managers. The timing of deposit collection is twofold: rst, a bank raises deposits
at the beginning of contracts to nance all the project managers who apply to the bank for
loans. Recall that the bank cannot tell poor managers from good managers ex ante. He thus
cannot select borrowers according to the type of managers at this point.8 Second, the bank
raises additional deposits, if necessary, during the interim period of the contracts when he
renances poor managers' projects. I shall assume that banks can raise deposits as much
as they want during the period under the nancial contracts. (In the general equilibrium,
households' choices regarding saving and rms' borrowing demand determine the amount
of deposit available to banks.) Given the assumption of nonidentiability, banks initially
lend the same amount to all project managers who apply to the banks for loans. I denote
the total amount of deposits raised by a bank as d and the total amount of lending as L. L
can be divided into two parts, L = L0 + L1. Here, L0 is the amount of initial lending and
L1 is the amount of renancing, if any.
The objective of banks is to maximize prots from lending. The prot of banks is
8Deposits are made in the form of the consumption good which is non-storable. Also, there is no outside
option for the usage of deposits. Banks thus have no option but to lend to all managers who apply for loans.
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dened as:
bank = ~R~L Rd:
In this prot formula, R, ~R and ~L denote the gross deposit interest rate, the gross loan
interest rate and the repaid portion of lending, respectively. ~L can be L, the total amount
of lending, or a part of L, depending on whether or not poor managers divert. As we will
see later, ~L is a constant fraction of d in any equilibrium. I assume that the banking sector
is competitive and that banks take the interest rates as given. The competitive nature of
the banking sector and the constant return to scale of the prot with respect to d imply that
banks' prot is zero in equilibrium.
Now suppose that a poor manager diverts and asks the bank for renancing, at which
point he is able to observe the type of the manager. The bank has two options: renancing
her project or liquidating it. If the bank renances the poor manager's project, he extends
credit by the same amount as the diversion. That is, the amount of renancing, L1, is
(1  ) L0.9 In this case, the loans to good managers, the non-diverted portion of loans
to poor managers and the renancing loans are repaid. I assume that the poor manager is no
longer capable of diversion after she obtains renancing. She thus nally starts to produce
the consumption good. If the bank liquidates the project, he then squeezes the assets of the
rm, whose value is Q. Banks take the liquidation value as given in the nancial contracts. I
will discuss banks' incentives to renance in section 1.3.1, and I will describe what consists
of rms' liquidation value in section 1.3.2.
The incentive of renancing  Soft budget constraint
To understand why banks rescue poor rms, it is important to distinguish between ex
ante and ex post incentives due to the sunk nature of initial lending. At the time when
9Each poor manager obtains L0 and the population of poor managers are (1 ). Because the production
function is continuous in k, there can be other renancing schemes. Indeed, as long as ~R > R, which is true in
the renancing regime, banks can obtain unbounded prot by setting L1 !1. However, prot maximizing
rms never demand an innite amount of borrowing and they demand just the same amount as poor managers
divert given ~R. As a result, the options for banks are whether to renance by L0 or liquidate the project.
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banks realize that poor managers divert, the diverted part of initial lending is already sunk.
Banks thus compare the net return from new lending with the liquidation value of the
outstanding loan for the renancing-liquidation choice. This leads us to the following
renancing condition.
Condition 1 Banks are willing to renance poor managers' projects ex post if and only if
( ~R  R)L0  Q
The left-hand side of this condition is the net ex post return from renancing. By com-
pensating for the lost part of initial lending, banks obtain the gross return ~RL0. Renancing
requires banks to raise additional L0 units of deposits, which costs RL0. The net ex post
return is thus ( ~R   R)L0.10 Note banks do not consider the cost of initial lending when
calculating the ex post return. This is because the cost of initial lending is already sunk.
Note also that all banks have a common incentive, as R, ~R and Q are given and identical
among all banks.
Banks' ex ante incentive is different from their ex post incentive: banks do not have an
ex ante incentive to renance if ~R < (1+)R, that is, if the rate of return of the investment
is less than the cost of investment, including renancing. If this condition is satised,
banks, ex ante, have incentives to commit not to renance. However, this commitment
is not credible because poor managers know that banks are willing to renance once the
banks realize that poor managers diverted the borrowing.
Having viewed the incentive for banks, poor managers' incentive is obvious. Poor
managers divert if and only if condition 1, banks' ex post incentive, is satised. Otherwise,
poor managers immediately start production because they anticipate that diversion will not
be successful. This implies the liquidation never occurs in equilibrium.
10In principle, banks can squeeze required repayments without renancing due to the continuity of the
production function: as long as total output less wage payments is more than the required loan repayment,
banks can claim that part of the output because rm owners are the residual claimers in this model. However,
the assumption that the rm owners severely punish poor managers implies that the poor managers would
not produce output without renancing. This is because poor managers would be unwilling to engage in
production while they are punished.
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Note that the amount of capital produced by poor managers is the same as that of good
managers, regardless of whether poor managers behave or divert. Even if poor managers
divert, banks cover the losses in equilibrium due to the incentive structure above. Then,
the amount of borrowing that poor managers invest to produce capital is the same as that
of good managers. The amount of loan repayment is also the same across all rms for the
same reason. The amount is ~RL0 in any case.
1.3.2 Dynamic general equilibrium
In this subsection, I describe dynamic consumption-saving choices and the concept
of dynamic general equilibrium. Households and rm owners make the dynamic choices
in my model. Households' savings go to banks, but rm owners have means of saving
through land transactions. The main reason why I differentiate between the means of saving
is to obtain analytical properties of the equilibrium. In calculating the allocation of the
general equilibrium, the nancial contracts above are built in period by period.11 That is,
once households make decisions regarding saving, banks take the savings as deposits and
lend them to project managers. Thereafter, the decision mechanisms of banks and project
managers are as described above
Households
There exists a unit mass of innitely-lived households. They derive utility from con-
sumption, ch. They supply a xed amount of labor, normalized to one, in each period. The
means of saving for households are bank deposits. One unit of saving today yields R units
of gross return tomorrow. Households are the fundamental savers in this model. Formally,
households' problem is written in a simple way as:
11I can safely introduce the contracts period by period because rm managers die in one period. The
histories of project managers become irrelevant, and banks have no way of identifying the type of managers
at the beginning of each period.
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max
1X
s=t
s t log ch;s;
s:t: ch;t + dt+1 = wt +Rtdt:
 is the subjective discount rate of households, d is the saving of households and w is
real wage rate. Solving this problem yields the following rst-order conditions:
1
ch;t
=
Rt
ch;t+1
; (1.1)
lim
T!1
T t
1
ch;T
dT+1 = 0:
Firm owners
Firm owners own land and appoint project managers to utilize their land. A manager,
either good or poor, is randomly assigned to a rm owner, given the assumption that rm
owners are incapable of judging the types of project managers. Firm owners have unlim-
ited liability; they compulsorily provide their wealth to banks when their rms default.
This setup differs from the notion of a corporation, where rm owners (or shareholders)
have limited liability. However, this case is more relevant to the bank lending structure in
Japan: more than 70% of bank loans were originated to small-to-medium sized rms whose
structures are characterized by unlimited liability. (See, for example, Ogawa and Kitasaka
(2000)). Also, this specication is a convenient way of highlighting the role of land in the
determination of liquidation value and equilibrium.
Firm owners live innitely and derive utility from consumption, cl. Their resources are
the prot from the operation of rms, t, and the value of land, qtmt, which they own at the
beginning of the period. q denotes the price of land, and I assume that the total supply of
land in this economy is xed to m for all periods. As I described in the beginning of section
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1.3.2, excluding rm owners from the deposit market enables me to derive the analytical
properties of the equilibrium. The rm owners' problem is written as follows:
max
1X
s=t
~
s t
log cl;s;
s:t: cl;t + qtmt+1 = t + qtmt:
t = yt + (1  )kt   wtnt   ~RtL0;t:
~ is the subjective discount rate of rm owners and  is the depreciation rate of capital.12
Firm owners are residual claimers in the sense that the prot, t, is gross output (yt +
(1   )kt) less wage and loan payments.13 Although rm owners face uncertainty in the
assignment of project managers, there is no uncertainty in capital creation, production and
loan repayment. Remember that regardless of whether poor managers behave or divert,
they produce the same amount of capital as good managers. Poor managers also repay
the same amount to banks as good managers. I can thus write the prot formula without
uncertainty. Firm owners are the agents who determine the resource allocations of the
rms, and project managers are the agents who implement the production and the nancial
transactions in this model. Capital creation as well as labor demand are thus relevant choice
variables for rm owners.
Solving the rm owner's problem yields the following rst-order conditions:
12Capital can be converted to the consumption good in a one-to-one relation by project managers.
13In equilibrium, this corresponds to the product of land.
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qt
cl;t
=
~
cl;t+1
[(1  k   n) yt+1
mt+1
+ qt+1]; (1.2)
wt = n
yt
nt
;
~Rt = k
yt
kt
+ (1  );
lim
T!1
~
T t 1
cl;T
qTmT+1 = 0:
Other than the role of land as an input of production, the value of land, qtmt, functions
as the liquidation value of rms. Remember that project managers themselves do not own
any resources. When a poor manager defaults and the bank decides to liquidate the rm
(though liquidation does not occur in equilibrium), the bank claims the rm owner's land
because this represents the only asset that the rm possesses. In this sense, the liquidation
value, Q, which is taken as given in the nancial contract is the value of land, qm, and this
value is determined endogenously in the general equilibrium.
It is worthwhile to note that the liquidation value of rms consists solely of the value
of land. This implies that the economy is vulnerable to specic shocks to land value, as the
uctuation of the land price is crucial in determining banks' incentive and the entire regime
of the economy.
It is an assumption that rm owners do not have access to the deposit market. The
payoff of this assumption is that this enables us to obtain analytical solutions of rm own-
ers' consumption and the land price. This comes from the fact that the net savings of rm
owners are always zero in equilibrium (qtmt+1 = qtmt = qt m).14 On the other hand, this
specication generates a gap in the rate of return between capital and land. In Appendix
A, I construct a model in which I unify households and rm owners, thereby equating the
rates of return. There, I show that the one-sector model has the same properties as the
benchmark model.
14The homogeneity of rm owners and the xed supply of land imply that each rm owner owns the same
amount of land at every period.
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Equilibrium
Because the production function of each manager exhibits a constant return to scale and
identical technology, I can safely aggregate their production functions:
yt = At(nt)
n(kt)
k(mt)
1 n k :
Here, nt denotes the labor demand. In equilibrium, the labor demand is set equal to the
labor supply, which is xed to one. Thus prices satisfy the following conditions:
wt = nyt;
~Rt = k
yt
L0;t
+ (1  ): (1.3)
qt = ~

cl;t+1
cl;t
 1 
(1  k   n) yt+1
mt+1
+ qt+1

:
The rst two conditions state that the rental rates of labor and capital are their marginal
products. The last line tells that the land price today is the sum of the discounted value of
the marginal product and the resale value of land tomorrow.
In equilibrium, this economy falls into one of the two regimes, depending on the ex
post incentive for banks. I dene the two regimes as follows:
Denition 1 The economy is said to be in the normal regime at time s if
( ~Rs   Rs)L0;s < qsm; (1.4)
ds = L0;s = ks; ~Rs = Rs:
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and it is said to be in the renancing regime at time s if
( ~Rs   Rs)L0;s  qsm; (1.5)
1
1 + (1  ) ds = L0;s = ks;
~Rs = [1 + (1  )]Rs:
The equations in the second line of the renancing regime hint at the inefciencies of
that regime. First, we can see that not all the savings are allocated to the creation of capital
(indicated by the term 1
1+(1 )ds). Second, the loan interest rate is higher than the deposit
interest rate (indicated by ~Rs = [1 + (1  )]Rs). This is because banks need to squeeze
more from the undiverted part of lending because the other part is not repaid.
Having dened the regime, I introduce the notion of a "regime path".
Denition 2 (Regime Path) Let s 2 f0; 1g be an indicator variable at time s where s =
1 if the economy is in the normal regime at time s and s = 0 otherwise. A regime path
fsg1s=t is a sequence of s. Let I be the set of all regime path. Dene IN 2 I as the normal
path where s = 1 for 8s  t; and Dene IR 2 I as the renancing path where s = 0 for
8s  t.
Now I am in a position to dene the concept of an equilibrium.
Denition 3 (Equilibrium) An equilibrium is a regime path fsg1s=t, an allocation
fch;s; cl;s; ds+1;ms+1g1s=t and associated prices
n
ws; Rs; ~Rs; qs
o1
s=t
given dt and mt such
that
1. Households' optimality condition (1.1) is satised
2. Firm owners' optimality condition (1.2) is satised. And each rm owner ownsms =
m for 8s  t.
3.
n
ws; ~Rs; qs
o1
s=t
satises (1.3)
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4. If s = 1, (1.4) is satised. In particular, ( ~Rs   Rs)ds < qsm. The aggregate
resource constraint is given by ys = ch;s + cl;s + ds+1   (1  )ds.
5. If s = 0, (1.5) is satised. In particular, ( ~Rs   Rs) ds1+(1 )  qsm. The aggregate
resource constraint is given by ys = cs;t + cs;t + ds+1   (1 )1+(1 )ds.
For future reference, I call an equilibrium where fsg1s=t = IN and the associated
allocation and the prices satisfy the denition above as the normal equilibrium. On the
other hand, I call an equilibrium where fsg1s=t = IR and the associated allocation and the
prices satisfy the denition above as the renancing equilibrium.
1.4 The dynamics and the selection of equilibrium
I examine the dynamic properties and the equilibrium selection of the model in this sec-
tion. I rst show the analytical properties of the dynamics in two special equilibria, namely,
the normal equilibrium and the renancing equilibrium. I then show wedges incurred by
zombie lending through the Euler equation of households' consumption. Finally, I con-
duct a simulation to illustrate the interaction between the incentive and the macroeconomic
effects.
1.4.1 The dynamics
In the normal equilibrium, the equations that describe the dynamics of the economy are
represented by the following system:
1
ch;t
=

ch;t+1

kAt+1d
ak 1
t+1 m
1 k n + (1  ) ;
ch;t + dt+1 = (k + n)Atd
k
t m
1 k n + (1  )dt; (1.6)
cl;t = (1  k   n)Atdkt m1 k n ;
qt =
~
1  ~ (1  k   n)Atd
k
t m
 k n :
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The latter two equations reveal that rm owners' consumption and the land price have
analytical solutions: rm owners consume a constant fraction of output (remember that
kt = dt in this regime, so yt = Atdkt m1 k n .) and the land price is a constant fraction
of the marginal product of land today. However, it does not mean that rm owners do
not optimize dynamically. Instead, the assumption that rm owners are excluded from the
deposit market induces them to consume a constant fraction of output in the equilibrium.
Then, by substituting the consumption function into the land price formula (the third line
in (1.3)), we are able to see that rm owners evaluate the future marginal product of land
as a constant fraction, ~
s
, of today's marginal product of land. This dramatically simplies
the land price formula (See Appendix A for the derivation of (1.6)).
We can analyze household's consumption-saving decision separately by the rst two
equations in (1.6). (These equations derive from households' Euler equation and the ow
of budget constraint.) Figure 1-2 shows the graphical intuition of the dynamics of house-
holds' consumption and savings. This is a similar diagram as in the one-sector neoclas-
sical growth model (See, for example, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2003)). The two loci in
the graph correspond to the set of points in (d; ch) space such that consumption does not
change (ch;t+1   ch;t = 0) and savings do not change (dt+1   dt = 0). The ch = 0 locus
is increasing and concave in (d; ch) space, and the d = 0 locus is concave and intersects
twice with ch = 0 axis, with one of these intersections at the origin. As the graphical in-
tuition suggests, households' consumption-saving dynamics under the normal equilibrium
are summarized as follows:
Proposition 1 Let (dN ; cNh ) be the intersection of the ch = 0 locus and the d = 0
locus. Then, (dN ; cNh ) is the unique steady state of the normal equilibrium. Moreover,
it is globally saddle-point stable and globally monotone in the sense fch;s; dsg1s=t is an
increasing sequence when dt < dN and is a decreasing sequence when dt > dN . Finally,
fcl;sg1s=t and fqsg1s=t are increasing sequences when dt < dN and are decreasing sequences
when dt > dN .
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Figure 1-2: Phase diagram of households consumption and saving.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The statement above is almost obvious from the phase diagram and the last two equa-
tions in (1.6). When households' savings are below the steady state, households accumulate
savings and increase consumption over time by enjoying the return from savings. The speed
of saving accumulation slows down as they become close to the steady state, and they even-
tually converge to the steady state. During this course, rm owners increase their consump-
tion over time as their prot increases. Notice that the marginal unit of land yields more
output as the economy accumulates more capital. Mathematically, the cross-derivative of
the marginal product of land with respect to capital is positive. This implies that the land
price, as a function of the marginal product of land, also rises over time. Finally, it must be
true that banks do not have ex post incentives to renance poor managers' projects on the
course of the dynamics. Otherwise, the normal equilibrium is not sustainable.
We can obtain the corresponding system of equations, the phase-diagram and the dy-
namic properties of the renancing equilibrium. The system of equations in the renancing
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equilibrium is:
1
ch;t
=

ch;t+1

1
1+(1 )

kAt+1

dt+1
1+(1 )
ak 1
m1 k n + (1  )

;
ch;t + dt+1 = (k + n)At

dt
1+(1 )
ak
m1 k n + (1 )
1+(1 )dt; (1.7)
cl;t = (1  k   n)At

dt
1+(1 )
ak
m1 k n ;
qt =
~
1  ~ (1  k   n)At

dt
1+(1 )
ak
m k n :
The phase diagram of the renancing equilibrium is similar to that of the normal equi-
librium. However, thed = 0 locus is always below that of the normal equilibrium, and the
ch = 0 locus intersects with thed = 0 locus at the point (dR; cRh ) at which dR < dN and
cRh < c
N
h . Remember that (dN ; cNh ) is the steady state of the normal equilibrium. As a result,
households' consumption and savings in the steady state of the renancing equilibrium are
less than those of the normal equilibrium. This implies that rm owners' consumption is
less and that the land price is lower in the steady state of the renancing equilibrium. The
intuition is that households are discouraged from saving because of the low return of de-
posits under the renancing regime. This comes from the fact that poor managers divert in
the renancing regime. I give a more detailed explanation of this mechanism in the next
subsection.
1.4.2 Wedges in the renancing regime.
Wedges arise in the renancing regime precisely because poor managers divert their
borrowings. We can see the wedges when we look at the Euler equation of households:
1
ch;t
=

ch;t+1
8>><>>: 11+(1 )| {z }
(b)
2664kAt+1 dt+11+(1 )| {z }
(a)
ak 1
m1 k n + (1  )
3775
9>>=>>; : (1.8)
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Part (a) in the equation (1.8) represents the waste of savings. In the renancing regime,
poor managers divert some of their borrowings to enjoy private benets. This impedes
the full use of households' savings from the social point of view.15 Moreover, this waste of
savings forces banks to charge higher loan interest rates to meet the deposit obligation. Part
(b) in (1.8) reects this and it can be interpreted as the inverse of the risk premium of bank
loans. Combining (a) and (b), I can show that the return from deposits in the renancing
regime is less than that of the normal regime given the level of savings.
The underlying story initially comes from the demand side of loans. The higher loan in-
terest rate depresses the borrowing demands of rms. In equilibrium, the smaller borrowing
demands lower the deposit interest rate, thereby reducing households' savings. This mech-
anism is qualitatively similar to the congestion effects studied by Caballero et al. (2008)
and the crowding-out effects studied by Barseghyan (2008). In my model, all of the adjust-
ments of investment take place through intensive margins. The mechanism in my model
is thus closer to the crowding-out effects. In my model, banks' endogenous incentive ef-
fectively creates the crowding-out effects while they arise from the exogenous government
bailout in Barseghyan (2008).
As for the wedges for rm owners, the loan risk premium (part (b)) does not take effect
because the rm owners do not save in the form of deposits. However, the waste of savings
still affects their welfare. The reduced rate of capital creation (k = d
1+(1 ) ) lowers their
prot and thus it lowers the consumption of rm owners (See the third equation of (1.7)).
15As I assumed, the private benets for rm managers are small relative to the utility of households and
rm owners ( is small).
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1.4.3 The interaction between the incentive and the macroeconomic
effects
The Incentive in equilibrium
The most interesting feature of my model is that banks' incentive can entirely change
the regime of the economy: the direction of the inequality ( ~R R)L0 R qm is important
in determining an equilibrium. Before examining the nexus of the incentive and the general
equilibrium effects, it is useful to introduce conditions on the determination of equilibrium
regimes. By substituting the equilibrium conditions (1.6) and (1.7) into the incentive con-
ditions in (1.4) and (1.5) (see details in Appendix A), I get the following statement:
Lemma 1 At time s (s  t), the normal regime can be supported in an equilibrium if and
only if
(1  )[k + 1 As m1 k n d
1 ak
s ] <
~
1  ~ (1  k   n): (1.9)
Likewise, at time s (s  t), the renancing regime can be supported in an equilibrium if
and only if
1 
1+(1 ) [k +
1 
As m1 k n

ds
1 + (1  )
1 ak
] 
~
1  ~ (1  k   n): (1.10)
Proof. See Appendix A.
The intuition of this lemma becomes clear when we set  = 1, when the capital depre-
ciates fully in one period. In this case, only the parameters (k; n; ~; ; ) matter for the
selection of the regimes. First, a higher capital share indicates a greater likelihood that the
renancing regime is supported. This is because the value of capital increases and the value
of land decreases when k becomes large. An increase in ~ makes the renancing regime
less likely to be supported as this implies that rm owners value land more highly. When
 rises, it becomes less likely that the renancing regime is supported. An increase in 
yields the same prediction. Increases in these parameters increase the cost of renancing.
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When  6= 1 the level of savings affects the incentive condition and makes the renancing
regime more likely to hold. It is possible that both inequalities are simultaneously satised,
implying that the model can have multiple equilibria. However, the following condition
eliminates many possible equilibria.
Proposition 2 Assume that total factor productivity,A, is constant over time. Let d satisfy
the following equation:
max
(
(1  )[k + 1 A m1 k n (d)1 ak ]; 1 1+(1 ) [k + 1 As m1 k n

d
1 + (1  )
1 ak
]
)
=
~
1  ~ (1  k   n):
Then only the renancing regime is supported at time s in an equilibrium if the level of
saving satises ds  d.
Proof. See Appendix A.
This condition still does not guarantee the global uniqueness of the solution. How-
ever, it narrows the set of possible equilibria. In particular, we have a following corollary
about the feasibility of the renancing equilibrium.16 (I display a graphical intuition of the
corollary in Figure 1-3.)
Corollary 1 Assume that total factor productivity, A, is constant over time. The renanc-
ing equilibrium can be supported as an equilibrium if dt  dR and d  dR where dt is the
initial level of deposit, dR is the steady-state level of deposit in the renancing equilibrium
and d is dened as in proposition 2.
16I suspect that none but the renancing equilibrium is the equilibrium in this case. The intuition is the
following: the renancing equilibrium is the worst equilibrium in the sense that it produces the least output
compared to other equilibria where the normal regime is supported at some points of time. Even in this
"worst" equilibrium, households do not reduce savings below dR if the initial saving level is greater than dR.
Then for any equilibrium, it would not be optimal to have savings lower than dR, as the marginal return of
savings is at least as large as in the renance equilibrium at any point of time.
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Figure 1-3: Graphical intuition of corollary 1
A simulation  factor specic shock
In this subsection, I conduct an experiment to show how the perverse incentive of zom-
bie lending interacts with the general equilibrium effects. The interaction causes the econ-
omy to select the renancing equilibrium under certain sets of parameters. I interpret this
interaction as a coordination failure among households, rm owners and banks to resolve
non-performing loan problems; they are not able to internalize the behavior of other par-
ties, thereby acting with the expectation of inevitable bailouts. This materializes the welfare
decreasing outcome.
I give a shock to the model that changes incentives for banks. The shock that hits in
this economy is a permanent shock to k. This raises the marginal product of capital and
lowers the marginal product of land under the parameter values in Table 1-1. Intuitively,
this shock lowers the liquidation value while raising the net return from renancing. Note
that the focus of this simulation is the results of changes in banks' incentive. The capital
share shock is a convenient way to change the incentive.
Table 1-1 shows the parameter values in pre-shock periods and post-shock periods. The
time frequency is annual. The discount rate and the depreciation rate are consistent with
many RBC studies. In principle ~ can differ from . However I assume  = ~ in this
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Description Pre-shock Post-shock
; ~ Discount rates 0:975 0:975
 Depreciation rate 0:1 0:1
k Capital share 0:28 ! 0:30
n Labor share 0:67 0:67
1   The share of poor managers 0:15 0:15
 Diversion capacity 0:15 0:15
Table 1-1: Parameter values of the economy
simulation. I calibrate the share of poor managers (1  ) to match the observations about
zombie lending reported in Caballero et al. (2008). They estimate that the asset-weighted
share of zombie rms17 reached to 15% by the middle of the 1990s and that it remained
around that level during the latter half of the 1990s. I thus set 1  to be 0:15. The diversion
parameter, , is difcult to calibrate directly. Instead, I calibrate this parameter to target
the interest rate spread between the average lending rate and the average deposit rate. In
this model, (1   )   represents this spread if the renancing regime were supported.
According to the data published by Bank of Japan, this spread uctuated around 200bps
during the 1990s.  = 0:15 is consistent with the data. I could neither nd reliable estimates
of the capital share nor those of the land share in Japan. Instead, I use values from a study
by Valentinyi and Herrendorf (2008), who estimate these shares in the U.S. economy.
I assume that the economy is in the steady state of the normal equilibrium at pre-shock
periods. Indeed, under the pre-shock parameters, the steady-state allocation of the normal
equilibrium is supported as an equilibrium. The shock raises k from 0:28 to 0:30, a 7:1%
increase; a large shock is required to change the regime of the economy.
Figure 1-4 plots the impulse responses to the shock. The solid line is the actual path of
the economy. The economy follows the renancing path because the condition in Corollary
17Zombie rms are dened as rms that obtain some form of interest payment concessions from banks.
Caballero et al. (2008) note that these shares are sensitive to some extent to the manner of dening the
minimum required interest payment. As a result, the calibrations in my model face uncertainty. I conrm that
the equilibrium selection does not change in the simulation for small changes in the parameters.
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Figure 1-4: Impulse responses to one-time permanent shock to capital share (k)
1 is satised.18 For comparison purposes, I show a hypothetical path of the economy with
dashed lines. In this hypothetical path, I assume that the economy follows the normal path
but that path is not supported with post-shock parameters.
On impact, the normal regime is no longer supported, and banks start to renance poor
projects. Households reduce savings on impact due to the low return of deposits. This con-
trasts with the hypothetical normal path along which households increase savings. Note
that the shock itself enhances savings (The rise of k increases the marginal product of
capital), but the prevalence of zombie rms lowers the rate of return. As a mirror im-
age, households increase their consumption on impact by destocking savings. Moreover,
they keep reducing the amount of saving over time because they anticipate that banks will
engage in zombie lending in the future.
The land price plunges on impact. The sudden drop of the marginal product of land
18I assume that the economy switches to the renancing equilibrium. It may be possible that the economy
falls into other types of equilibria, where normal regimes are supported at some points of time. However
households' deposits, d, must decline less than dR to realize these types of equilibria under the calibrated
parameters. I suspect this cannot happen due to the reason outlined in footnote 16.
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lowers the valuation of land. More importantly, the land price continues to decline after
the shock. This is an indirect effect of the decline of households' savings. Recall that
the marginal product of land is increasing in capital. Anticipating that the stock of capital
decline, which reduces the marginal product of land, the rm owners lower the valuation
of land over time.
On the other hand, the path of the economy that results from the dynamic choices of
households and rm owners actually justies banks' incentive to engage in zombie lending:
interest rates and the land price are consistent with the banks' ex post incentive to engage
in zombie lending. Banks thus have no option but to renance poor managers' projects.
That is, the condition in proposition 2 is satised on the course of the dynamics.
To summarize, a lack of coordination among households, rm owners and banks to re-
solve non-performing loan problems forces the economy to select the renancing equilib-
rium in this simulation. Because households and rm owners cannot control the outcome
of the nancial contracts, they are discouraged from saving if they anticipate that banks
will engage in zombie lending. On the other hand, banks take the prices as given, and these
prices are determined by the general equilibrium. If the prices are such that condition 1 is
satised, then banks have no choice but to renance poor managers' projects. In the worst
case scenario, the coordination failure lasts forever, and the economy is not able to exit the
inefcient renancing regime.
The interpretation of the results in relation with the Japanese experience
Land took an important role in Japanese banking: land was a common form of col-
lateral of the bank loans. However, after the beginning of the 1990s, when land prices
suddenly fell, banks were unable to recover loan losses by squeezing the collateral. This
abrupt change in business environment is one of the factors that banks evergreened loans
to insolvent rms. These banks' incentives were reinforced by loose government policy on
non-performing loans, which I formalize in terms of my model in the next section. This
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phenomenon is essentially an SBC syndrome dened in Kornai et al. (2003).
One may suspect that the factor-specic shock in the simulation does not summarize
the nature of shocks that hit Japan during the 1990s. That could be true, and I do not argue
against this point in this chapter. Rather, my focus is on the aftermath of shocks that drop
land prices. My model has rich implications in this respect, whatever the nature of the
shocks19; the ineffective use of savings and the associated increase of the risk premium
discourage households from saving and crowd out investment. Moreover, the interaction
between the incentive and the general equilibrium effects under the lack of coordination
among agents can cause the economy to select an inefcient equilibrium.
This model focuses on bailouts of insolvent rms whose prospects are still good when
they default on initial debt. Remember that the net continuation value of poor rms,
~R  R

, is positive under the renancing regime. To some extent, this understates the
banking problem in Japan. It has been said that banks have continued to extend credit to
rms whose net present value is even negative. As discussed by many economists, I need
to take into account the regulatory issues specic to Japan to explain why banks bailed out
seriously troubled rms. However, this chapter shows even a mild degree of zombie lend-
ing, rescuing rms whose net continuation value is positive, induces serious moral hazard
problems. As we can see in Figure 1-4, the problem has economically signicant impacts.
1.5 Policy analyses
In this section, I conduct policy exercises to hint at desirable policies to restore the
efciency of the economy. I focus on two policies, namely government bailouts and the
strict enforcement of loan-loss provisions, and I show which policy the government should
have taken to restore the efcient allocation in mymodel. As these policies are the measures
19In terms of my model, I can generate the same results when I lower ~, the discount rate of rm owners.
Effectively, this shock lowers rm owners' valuation of land. Alternatively, investment-specic technology
shocks a la Greenwood, Hercowitz and Krusell (2000) also work in the same way.
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that the Japanese government took, I am able to evaluate the effects of these policies in
terms of my model.
1.5.1 The government bailout
The Japanese government continuously bailed out troubled banks during the 1990s. It
injected capital to troubled banks several times. However, more importantly, it implicitly
bailed out troubled banks by overlooking non-performing loans. As described in section
1.2, the bank supervision department in Japan did not actively inspect banks' voluntary re-
ports on the quality of loan portfolios. Thus, banks could easily hide non-performing loans
to meet minimum capital requirements. The implicit bailouts effectively took the form that
banks accumulated claims to the deposit insurance system managed by the government.
This is called regulatory forbearance.
Because the implicit bailouts are not fundamentally different from explicit bailouts in
the sense that the government covers the losses of impaired loans, I dene the government
bailout in a simple way: the government grants  2 [0; ] units of credit per unit of initial
lending if banks renance poor managers' projects. This means that banks have to raise
only (   )L0 units of additional deposits when they renance poor managers' projects.
Then, the ex post incentive condition such that banks are willing to renance poor man-
agers' projects changes, as:
h
~Rs  Rs(   )
i
L0;s  qsm: (1.11)
An instant look at (1.11) hints that it is less likely to recover efciency when the gov-
ernment bails out troubled banks. This is because the cost of renancing for banks shrinks
to Rs(   ) per unit of initial lending.
The remaining modications that need to be done are those to the government budget.
I assume that the government runs a balanced budget and levies a lump-sum tax on house-
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holds.20 Let  t be the amount of the lump-sum tax. The following conditions must hold in
equilibrium:
ch;t + dt+1 = wt +Rtdt    t;
 t =

(1  )
1 + (1  )(   )dt

(1  t) :
The starting point in this exercise is to assume that the economy cannot attain the nor-
mal equilibrium, the rst-best outcome, without government interventions. In particular,
the normal regime is not supported at initial period, time t, given the initial level of savings
dt < d
N : I then obtain the following result:
Proposition 3 Assume that dt < dN and dt satises the following condition:
(1  )[k + 1  
A m1 k n
d1 akt ] 
~
1  ~ (1  k   n):
(This implies that the normal regime is not supported in any equilibrium at time t.) Assume
further that A is constant. Then, for any  2 [0; ], the normal path cannot be supported
as an equilibrium. That is, the government bailout never restores the rst-best outcome.
Proof. See Appendix A.
In my model, the government bailout strengthens banks' incentive to renance poor
projects. It is never an optimal policy in terms of restoring efciency in this economy.
Regulatory forbearance, a policy that the Japanese government adopted up to the end of the
1990s, was welfare diminishing.21
20The Japanese government did not run a balanced budget, instead issuing government bonds. However,
the assumption of a balanced budget yields the same result as long as a lump-sum tax is available and Ricar-
dian equivalence holds, as in my model. Ricardian equivalence breaks in Barseghyan (2008), and a lump-sum
tax is not available in Dekle and Kletzer (2005). These setups create additional dimensions of inefciency.
21There are, however, certain welfare-improving aspects of the government bailout in my model. Allow-
ing the economy to stay in the renancing regime, the increase of the government bailout reduces the risk
premium of loan interest rates. This is because the costs that banks pay for renancing decreases as a result
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I admit that my model may understate the benets of government bailouts. In the real
world, there may be some benets from bailing out troubled banks: bailing out one bank
may prevent chain reaction bankruptcies of multiple banks; the injection of capital may re-
store banks' ability to lend, thereby stimulating the economy; and the transfer of resources
to rm sectors, through nancial intermediaries, has a strong multiplier effect on invest-
ment when rms face borrowing limits. Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1998) and Kato
(2007) and others have illustrated this mechanism. However, I can claim that the bailout
policy alone is not a desirable policy package, as it can aggravate the moral hazard prob-
lem. The moral hazard problem is not trivial because shifts between equilibrium regimes
induce large gaps in welfare.
1.5.2 The strict enforcement of loan-loss provisions
I dene the strict enforcement of loan-loss provisions as a requirement for banks to
accumulate loan-loss reserves. I assume that the government can observe the quality of
loan portfolios costlessly at the time when banks make renancing-liquidation decisions
on poor managers' projects. Also, for simplicity, I assume that the government requires
banks to accumulate  2 [0; ] units of loan-loss provisions per unit of initial lending
if banks renance the poor projects. This implies that the renancing incurs an additional
cost by RL0. As a result, banks' ex post incentive for engaging in zombie lending changes
as follows: h
~Rs  Rs( + )
i
L0;s  qsm: (1.12)
By the amount of RL0, banks' incentive to renance poor managers' projects is weak-
ened. This has an immediate implication as follows:
of the bailout. In the limiting case of the full bailout, that is,  = , the investment discouraging distortion
in (1.8) disappears. However, the government spending wedge,  , becomes large in this case. As a result,
inefciency never vanishes, and there would be an optimal degree of government bailout that balances the
investment wedge and the government spending wedge.
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Proposition 4 Assume that dt < dN and dt satises the following condition:
(1  )[k + 1  
A m1 k n
d1 akt ] 
~
1  ~ (1  k   n):
Assume further that A is constant. Suppose there exists 0     that satises the
following equation:
[1     ] [k + 1  
A m1 k n
 
dN
1 ak ] = ~
1  ~ (1  k   n):
Then the normal equilibrium is restored for 8 2 (; ].
Proof. See Appendix A.
This type of policy summarizes one of the measures that were introduced in the "Pro-
gram for Financial Revival" in 2002: the Financial Services Agency of Japan nally de-
cided to intensify the monitoring of banks and demanded that banks accumulate appropriate
loan-loss reserves. The objective of this policy was to clean out the corruption of the bank-
ing sector and to bring back the correct incentives for banks to terminate zombie lending.22
As Aghion, Bolton and Fries (1999) shows, things are not so straightforward when the
condition of loan portfolios is private knowledge to banks. In this case, the strict policy
can postpone the revelation of non-performing loans because bank managers fear that the
revelation puts the retention of their positions in the banks at risk.23 However, what the
Financial Services Agency did in the end was to make public the information on loan port-
folios. In this case, bank managers would no longer be capable of hiding non-performing
loans. Banks would then reveal the true condition of the loan portfolios and would refrain
from zombie lending.
22The program also introduced a measure called the "due consideration to loans to small-and-medium-
sized enterprises." This measure encouraged banks to lend to small-sized rms, in which zombie rms may
be included. In this sense, some parts of the program were contradicting with each other.
23In Aghion, Bolton and Fries (1999), bank managers care their own private benet.
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1.6 Conclusion
This chapter focuses on the interaction between the incentives and the macroeconomic
effects of zombie lending in Japan. In the model, the incentives and the macroeconomic
effects are interdependent; given the incentive of zombie lending, the low rates of return
discourage the agents from saving. However, the prices of loans, deposits and land, which
are affected by the saving choices of agents, actually justify the incentive for banks to
engage in zombie lending. I interpret this interaction as a result of the lack of coordination
to resolve non-performing loan problems. I believe that this mechanism highlights the
relationship between the decade-long economic downturn and the nancial breakdown in
Japan.
The bailout policy, which the Japanese government has taken until the very end of
the economic downturn, further strengthened banks' incentives to engage in zombie lend-
ing. On the contrary, the strict enforcement of loan-loss provisions, the measure that the
Japanese government ultimately took, can restore the efciency of the economy.
Let me conclude by providing a nal remark on the possibilities of the extensions of
this chapter. There are many immediate possibilities for extending my model, so long as
one can keep track of the incentive condition of banks. One can immediately introduce the
labor-leisure choice into my model. It would not be a hard task to introduce the entry-exit
decision of managers, thereby endogenizing the dynamics of zombie rms. These possi-
ble extensions would provide a richer understanding of bank-induced economic stagnation
without having to change the fundamental mechanism of this chapter.
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A Appendix A
Derivation of (1.6) and (1.7)
By substituting the price equations (1.3) into (1.1) and the budget constraint of house-
holds, it is immediate to obtain the rst two lines of the systems (1.6) and (1.7). For the
rm owners' consumption, substitute the equilibrium condition qtmt = qtmt+1 = qt m into
the budget constraint of rm owners. Then I obtain:
cl;t = t: (a.1)
Then, substituting the rst two lines of (1.3) into (a.1) yields:
cl;t = (1  k   n)yt: (a.2)
Finally, substitute the denition of the output which is yt = Atdakt m1 k n for the
normal regime and yt = At

dt
1+(1 )
ak
m1 k n for the renancing regime. Then I
obtain the equilibrium consumption of rm owners as in (1.6) and (1.7).
Now, the land price formula is written as follows:
qt =
1X
s=t
~
s t

cl;s
cl;t
 1
(1  k   n)ys
m
: (a.3)
By using (a.2), (a.3) can be simplied as:
qt =
cl;t
m
1X
s=t
~
s t
=
~
1  ~ (1  k   n)
yt
m
: (a.4)
Finally, by substituting the denition of output in each regime, I obtain the last lines of
(1.6) and (1.7).
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The steady state
The normal equilibrium
By setting ch;t = ch;t+1 and At = At+1 = A in the rst line of (1.6), I obtain:
1 = 
h
Ak
 
dN
k 1 m1 k n + 1  i ;
$ (a.5)
dN =

Ak m
1 k n
1   + 
 1
1 k
:
Now, set dt = dt+1 = dN . By substituting (a.5) into (1.6), I obtain:
cNh = A (k + n)
 
dN
k m1 k n   dN ;
cNl = A(1  k   n)
 
dN
k m1 k n : (a.6)
qN =
~
1  ~A(1  k   n)
 
dN

m k n :
The renancing equilibrium
Again, by setting ch;t = ch;t+1 and At = At+1 = A in the rst line of (1.7), I obtain:
1 = 

1
1+(1 )

Ak

dR
1+(1 )
k 1
m1 k n + 1  

;
 ! (a.7)
dR =

Ak m
1 k n
1 + (1  )    + 
 1
1 k
:
Now, set dt = dt+1 = dR. By substituting (a.7) into (1.7), I obtain:
cRh = A (k + n)

dR
1+(1 )
k
m1 k n   (1 )+
1+(1 )d
R;
cRl = A(1  k   n)

dR
1+(1 )
k
m1 k n ; (a.8)
qR =
~
1  ~A(1  k   n)
 
dR

m k n :
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Proof of proposition 1
I rst show the local properties around the steady state and then I show the global
properties of the dynamics.
The rst two equations in (1.6) can be rewritten as a system of non-linear rst order
equations:
dt+1 = At (k + n) d
k
t m
1 k n + (1  ) dt   ch;t; (a.9)
ch;t+1 = ch;t
n
At+1k

At (k+n) d
k
t m
1 k n + (1  ) dt   ch;t
k 1 m1 k n+1  o :
(a.10)
Assume At = At+1. By taking the rst order Taylor approximation around the steady
state, I obtain the following linearized system:

dt+1
ch;t+1

= J

dt
ch;t

; J =
0B@ 1  1
 12 1 + 2
1CA :
where 1 = (k + n)

1 +


+1  and 2 = (1  k) (1   + )
h
k+n
k

1 +


  
i
.
To verify the local saddle-point stability, one of the eigenvalues of matrix J must be
inside the unit circle whereas the other must be outside of the unit circle. The eigenvalues
are obtained by solving the following quadratic equation:
x2   (1 + 2 + 1)x+ 1 = 0: (a.11)
38
Now, dene f(x) = x2   (1 + 2 + 1)x+ 1. It is immediate to see:
f(0) = 1 > 0;
f(1) =  2 < 0; (a.12)
f 0(0) =  (1 + 2 + 1) < 0:
By (a.12), we can see that one of the eigenvalues lies inside the unit circle and the other
lies outside the unit circle. Thus, the system is locally saddle-point stable. Moreover, the
smaller eigenvalue is greater than zero. This implies the dynamics around the steady state
is locally monotone24 in the sense fds+1; ch;sg1s=t is an increasing sequence if dt < dN and
dt is close enough to dN .
To verify the global saddle-point stability, it is useful to see the direction of dt+1 and
ch;t+1 given (dt; ch;t). The equation (a.9) and (a.10) can be rearranged as:
dt+1 = A (k + n) d
k
t m
1 k n   dt   ch;t; (a.13)
ch;t+1 = ch;t

Ak

A (k+n) d
k
t m
1 k n + (1  ) dt   ch;t
k 1
m1 k n+1    1


:
(a.14)
By (a.13), ch;t = A (k + n) dkt m1 k n dt whendt+1 = 0. Hence,dt+1 < 0
when ch;t > A (k + n) dkt m1 k n   dt i.e. ch;t is above dt+1 = 0 locus. On the
other hand, dt+1 > 0 when ch;t is below dt+1 = 0 locus.
By (a.14), Akdk 1t+1 m1 k n   1 + = 0 when ch;t+1 = 0. By substituting
(a.9), this is equivalent to say ch;t = A (k + n) dkt m1 k n + (1   )dt   dN when
ch;t+1 = 0. Hence ch;t+1 > 0 when ch;t is above ch;t+1 = 0 locus. On the other hand,
ch;t+1 < 0 when ch;t is below ch;t+1 = 0 locus.
These arguments boil down to the arrows in Figure A-1. By the direction of dt+1 and
24It can be proved that the smaller eigenvalue of J governs the dynamics along the stable arm of the system.
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Figure A-1
ch;t+1 given (dt; ch;t), one can see that the dynamics is globally saddle-point stable25.
To show the global monotonicity, it sufces to show that (dt+1; ch;t+1) never jumps into
region (iii) when (dt; ch;t) is in region (i) and vice versa in Figure A-1. Assume (dt; ch;t) is
in region (i). That is (dt; ch;t) satises the following conditions:
dt < d
N ;
ch;t  A (k + n) dkt m1 k n   dt; (a.15)
ch;t  A (k + n) dkt m1 k n + (1  )dt   dN :
By (a.9) and the second line of (a.15), the following inequality holds:
dt+1 = At (k + n) d
k
t m
1 k n + (1  ) dt   ch;t
 At (k + n) d
k
t m
1 k n + (1  ) dt
 A (k + n) dkt m1 k n + (1  )dt   dN
(a.16)
= dN :
25The origin in the (d; ch) space, that is (ds+1; ch;s) = (0; 0) for 8s  t, is also an equilibrium. However,
this equlibrium is uninteresting one. So I ignore this equilibrium.
40
This implies, at least, (dt+1; ch;t+1) never jumps into region (iii) in the gure when (dt; ch;t)
is in region (i) since dt+1  dN . Now assume (dt; ch;t) is in region (iii). That is (dt; ch;t)
satises the following conditions:
dt > d
N ;
ch;t  A (k + n) dkt m1 k n   dt; (a.17)
ch;t  A (k + n) dkt m1 k n + (1  )dt   dN :
By (a.9) and the second line of (a.17), the following inequality holds:
dt+1 = At (k + n) d
k
t m
1 k n + (1  ) dt   ch;t
 At (k + n) d
k
t m
1 k n + (1  ) d
 A (k + n) dkt m1 k n + (1  )dt   dN
(a.18)
= dN :
This implies, at least, (dt+1; ch;t+1) never jumps into region (i) in the gure when (dt; ch;t)
is in region (iii) since dt+1  dN , completing the proof.
I can apply the exactly the same logic for the global saddle-point stability and global
monotonicity of the renancing equilibrium.
Proof of lemma 1
( ~Rs   Rs)L0;s < qsm must be satised if time-s were to be in the normal regime.
In the normal regime, ~Rs = Rs = kAsdak 1s m1 k n + (1   ), L0;s = ds and qs =
~
1 ~ (1   k   n)Asdaks m k n . Then we obtain (1.9) by substituting these conditions
into the incentive condition in (1.4).
Similarly, ( ~Rs Rs)L0;s  qsmmust be satised if time-swere to be in the renancing
regime. In the renancing regime, 1
1+(1 )Rs =
~Rs = kAs

ds
1+(1 )
ak 1
m1 k n +
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(1  ), L0;s = ds1+(1 ) and qs =
~
1 ~ (1  k   n)As

ds
1+(1 )
ak
m k n . Then, we
obtain (1.10) by substituting these conditions into the incentive condition in (1.5). 
Proof of proposition 2
The left hand side of the inequality (1.9) is an increasing function of ds. Then there
exists threshold dN such that for 8ds  dN, the inequality (1.9) is not satised. Then, the
normal regime is not supported at time-s if ds  dN.
Similar argument proves that there exists threshold dR such that for 8ds  dR, the
inequality (1.10) is always satised. Then, for 8ds  maxfdN; dRg, only the the re-
nancing regime is supported at time-s if an allocation which satises denition 3 were to
be an equilibrium. Finally, it is immediate to show that d = maxfdN; dRg, completing
the proof.
Proof of proposition 3
By substituting the equilibrium condition of normal equilibrium into the equation (1.11),
I obtain:
(1   + )[k + 1  
A m1 k n
d1 akt ] 
~
1  ~ (1  k   n): (a.19)
Obviously, this is true for 8 2 [0; ] as long as the assumption in the proposition 3 holds.
Proof of proposition 4
Given the requirement of loan loss provision  2 [0; ] and given the level of saving ds
at time-s, notmal regime can be supported at time-s if:
(1     )[k + 1  
A m1 k n
(ds)
1 ak ] <
~
1  ~ (1  k   n): (a.20)
42
The left hand side of (a.20) is increasing in ds and decreasing in . Under normal equi-
librium, households' saving never exceeds dN if the initial level of saving, dt, satises
dt < d
N . Now assume that normal equilibrium is supported at a certain level of  2 [0; ].
Then (a.20) must be satised on the course of the dynamics of normal equilibrium. Since
fdsg1s=t is an increasing sequence which converges to dN , the left hand side of (a.20) in-
creases over time and converges to (1     )[k + 1 A m1 k n
 
dN
1 ak ].
Now, Let 0     satisfy the following equation:
(1     )[k + 1  
A m1 k n
 
dN
1 ak ] = ~
1  ~ (1  k   n): (a.21)
Then for 8 2 (; ], (1      )[k + 1 A m1 k n
 
dN
1 ak ] < ~
1 ~ (1   k   n).
This implies (a.20) is satised for 8 2 (; ], 8ds  dN . Thus normal equilibrium is
supported under 8 2 (; ].
One-sector dynamic general equilibrium model
The model in the main section of this chapter assumes that rms rent capital from
households while they own land. And rm owners repay debts to households while they
obtain dividend from land. Basically, rms issue debts to households while they issue
shares to themselves. This is a non-standard assumption in terms of the asset market struc-
tures of standard neo-classical dynamic general equilibrium models. However, the pay off
of this assumption is that I can obtain the analytical properties of the equilibria.
In this section, I build a one-sector dynamic general equilibrium model by unifying
households and rm owners in the main section. And I illustrate that the properties which I
showed in the main section apply to the standard one-sector model. The setup of the unied
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households in this model is as follows:
max
1X
s=t
s t log cs;
s:t: ct + dt+1 + qtmt+1 = wt +Rtdt + (qt + t)mt:
These households can allocate their wealth to bank deposits and land. I separate banks
into commercial banks in which households deposit and trust banks in which households
entrust land.  denotes the rental rate of land which trust banks pay to households. The
roles of commercial banks are the same as the banks in the main section. Trust banks
manage the land which households entrust. They rent the land to rms with rental rate .
One assumption which I make here is a subordinate structure of bank loans. Commercial
banks issue priority credit to rms. On the other hand, the lending of trust bank (of the form
of land) is subordinate lending. If a rm defaults, the commercial bank has an priority to
squeeze the assets of the rm. Hence the commercial bank takes the land and the trust bank
is left with nothing. This assumption enables me to incorporate exactly the same nancial
contract as in section 1.3.1 into this model.
There are a unit mass of rms. Firms are divided into good rms and poor rms. The
technologies and the incentives of good rms and poor rms are the same as the benchmark
model. I assume that commercial banks and trust banks cannot identify poor rms ex ante.
Once rms engage in production, their problem is dened as follows:
maxt = yt + (1  )kt   wtnt   ~RtL0;t   tmt;
s:t: kt = L0;t;
yt = At(nt)
n(kt)
k(mt)
1 n k :
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Figure A-2: Impulse responses of one sector DGE model to a permanent capital share
shock
By solving problems above, I obtain the following optimality conditions:
1
ct
=
Rt+1
ct+1
;
qt
ct
=

ct+1
 
t+1 + qt+1

;
wt = nyt;
~Rt = k
yt
L0;t
+ (1  );
t = (1  n   k)
yt
m
:
The denitions of regime and regime path are the same as Denition 1 and Denition 2.
The denition of equilibrium is slightly modied but it does not change essentially.
Now I conduct the same simulation as in section 1.4.3. I gave a permanent shock to
capital share k. The parameter values are the same as section 1.4.3.
Figure A-2 shows the impulse responses of the economy. As in the benchmark model
45
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
The Incentive under refinance equilibrium
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
The Incentive under hypothetical normal equilibrium
continuation value
liquidation value
Figure A-3: The incentives of commercial banks
of the main section, households reduce the amount of saving over time. This is because
households anticipate that commercial banks will engage in zombie lending. The land
price plunges on impact and it continues to decline over time. Households consumption
eventually converges to the steady state of the renancing equilibrium which is lower than
that of normal equilibrium.
One of the problem in this version of model is that we are not able to calculate the liqui-
dation value of rms analytically. This is because we cannot obtain the analytical formula
of the land price. Instead I compute it numerically and I show that the incentive condi-
tion of commercial banks support the renancing equilibrium while it does not support the
normal equilibrium.
Figure A-3 shows that the continuation value is greater than the liquidation value along
the path of the renancing equilibrium: The renancing equilibirum is supported as an
equilibrium. On the other hand, the liquidation value is less than the continuation value
along the path of the normal equilibrium: The normal equilibrium is not supported.
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Chapter 2
A Model of Securitization-Induced
Economic Crises
2.1 Introduction
The subprime crisis and the following economic recession are one of the worst eco-
nomic events since the great depression in U.S. One important aspect of this crisis is that
it started with the collapse of the subprime mortgage market in early 2007.26 Then the
turmoil spread to various nancial markets and liquidity dried up in U.S. nancial market
as a whole. Eventually, the real economy fell into recession and we are yet to see vigorous
recovery as of the end of 2009. Although the analysis of the entire mechanism of this crisis
is still ongoing research, a deep root of this crisis is likely to lie in the securitization of
subprime mortgages because it is the securitization market that collapsed rst. Many an-
alysts now view that subprime mortgages were cheaply nanced relative to their risks and
housing market overheated as a result.
This chapter attempts to construct a model of boom-and-bust cycles induced by secu-
ritization. In the model, risky loans, which can be considered as subprime mortgages, are
26According to Brunnermeier (2009). It well documents the entire chronology of this crisis.
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securitized. Ashcraft and Schuremann (2008) present that there are several stages of infor-
mation asymmetries in the process of securitization that could be causes for the subprime
crisis. I focus on the information asymmetry between issuers and investors on the quality
of underlying assets. And I examine the mechanism that securitization makes nancing
risky loans cheap thereby igniting booms in an aggregate economy. I also examine why
and how the rapid expansion of securitization suddenly ends by endogenizing the return of
securitized assets along with business cycles.
The following two ingredients are the keys and what distinguish my model from stan-
dard housing DSGE models: i) Investors mismeasure the default risks of the risky mort-
gages, i.e. a deviation from rational expectation. ii) The security design of securitized
assets amplies measurement errors in the default risks of risky mortgages. By embedding
these features in a dynamic housing model, the model generates boom-and-bust cycles sys-
tematically and gives a comprehensive understanding of crises induced by securitization.
The summary of a boom-and-bust cycle is as follows: the process begins with a devi-
ation from rational expectation by assuming that investors mismeasure the default risks of
risky loans. This assumption seems to be an inexpensive way to generate booms based on
irrational behavior. However, the deviation from rational expectation alone is not enough
to generate boom-and-bust cycles. It is the security design of securitized assets that enables
risky loans to be cheaply nanced. An important step in securitization is called tranching,
which means slicing the payout of the pool of underlying assets: tranching determines the
priority of loss absorption among different classes of securities backed by collateral. A
specic example of tranching can be seen in Coval et al. (2009), however, the point is
that securitization can be a device for informed agents to reallocate returns of collateral
in favor of them when there are uninformed agents. By this security design, issuers get
overcompensated, risky loans are cheaply nanced and booms in a economy are ignited.
The sustainability of a boom depends on the protability of securitization. In mymodel,
it is endogenized by connecting house price ination (hereafter HPI) with the recovery rate
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of defaulted loans, which is one of the components of the default risks of underlying assets;
risky loans are collateralized by housing stock. Therefore the recovery rate when loans are
in default consists of HPI. In this setting, the dynamics of HPI can cause the sudden end
of boom phases. As HPI declines on the course of dynamics, the expected return of the
securitized assets declines over time and, at some point, it is no longer high enough for
issuers to be willing to engage in securitization business. At this point, the securitization
market collapses and borrowers are forced to undergo severe adjustments.
There are good reasons to focus on the specications above. Some of the information
on the quality of underlying assets is likely to be masked to investors due to complicated
processes of securitization. Even credit ratings by professional rating agencies turned out
to be inaccurate in evaluating risks of securitized assets. This is evident from the fact that
many of AAA rated securitized assets defaulted and were devalued signicantly in 2007.
The information asymmetry between issuers and investors could have signicant impacts
on the generation of the boom-and-bust cycle. Coval, Jurek and Stafford (2009) and Heit-
eld (2009) illustrate that default risks of securitized assets are quite sensitive to default
risks of underlying assets. Agents who have richer information can take advantage of this
fact to obtain high return from securitization. Finally, the sharp decline in HPI right be-
fore the subprime crisis is one of the plausible candidates that triggered the crisis. Gerardi,
Shapiro and Willen (2007) nd that cumulative HPI has statistically and economically sig-
nicant impacts on the default probability of mortgages. If subprime mortgages take a
signicant part of the collateral in securitization, then the returns of the securitized assets
should be sensitive to the development of HPI.
The remaining parts of this chapter are organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the
model. I rst describe the structure of the securitization market focusing on information
available to each type of agents. Then I incorporate the securitization market into a dynamic
model of housing choices. Section 2.3 parameterizes and simulates the model. Here I check
whether a boom-and-bust cycle emerges under a reasonable parameterization. Section 2.4
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Figure 2-1: Overall structure of the economy
discusses the implication of the model and nally section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 The model
This section presents the structure of the model. Figure 2-1 depicts the structure. The
securitization market and the housing market are the centers of this analysis. In the securi-
tization market, nancial intermediaries purchase loans, create securitized assets and trade
them with investors. The default risks of the loans are the key determinants of the expected
return of the securitized assets. Investors have subjective belief on the default risks while
nancial intermediaries evaluate them accurately. As we will see later, this information
asymmetry is the fundamental source to generate boom-and-bust cycles. In the housing
market, borrowers and investors trade housing stock whose supply is xed to h. Their
dynamic choices on housing, consumption and saving (borrowing) determine the housing
allocation. Debts of borrowers are collateralized by the housing stock that they own. House
value thus plays an important role in determining the recovery rate of defaulted loans. This
in turn affects the return of securitized assets.
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2.2.1 The securitization market
Individual borrowers
There are measure one borrowers. They are divided into N types evenly.27 A borrower
obtains loan from a bank with the principal amount Bb. The loan is one-period lending
with the gross interest rate Rm which is exogenous.28 Each type of borrowers may default
their loans in the next period. The following latent factorXn governs the default of type n:
Xn =
p
Z +
p
1  "n;
Z  N(0; 1); "n  N(0; 1); Z ? "n;  2 [0; 1]; (2.1)
Xn   1 (), type n defaults,
Q : the recovery rate when default.
Xn is a linear combination of the aggregate factor Z which is common to all types
and the idiosyncratic factor "n which is specic to type n. Z and "n (8n) are stochastic,
standard normal and independent.  is the weight attached to the aggregate factor.29 Type
n borrowers default if Xn   1 (), where  1() is the inverse distribution function of
standard normal distribution. In other words, the marginal probability that type n defaults
is . If  6= 0, the latent factors fX1; X2;    ; XNg are correlated. In this case, defaults
among different types are also correlated. Finally, Q denotes the recovery rate of the loans
when they are defaulted. I assume that it is common to all types and Q < Rm. The
parameters (; ;Q) characterize the default risks of loans. We will see that they are critical
to the returns of the securitized assets that I introduce in this model.  and  are exogenous
27As we will see later, each type of borrowers may default their loans. If borrowers are divided unevenly,
not only the number of types that default but also which types default matters as each type differs in popu-
lation. We may be able to assume that every borrowers in [0; 1] interval are heterogeneous. However, this
complicates measuring of the joint distribution of defaults. Therefore, it is convenient to assume borrowers
are divided evenly, which implies N is a positive integer.
28Rm is still exogenous in the dynamic economy in the section 2.2.2.
29 p2 +  p1  2 = 1 implies that Xn is also a standard normal.  2 [0; 1] implies the bilateral
correlation between any pair of latent factors is positive.
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parameters throughout this chapter. On the other hand, I will endogenize Q in the dynamic
housing choice model in section 2.2.2.
Securitization
Financial intermediaries and investors are involved in the securitization market.30 The
most important assumption in this chapter is that nancial intermediaries and investors have
different information on the default risks of loans: nancial intermediaries know true (; )
while investors have own belief on these parameters. I denote investor's belief as (~; ~). I
describe how nancial intermediaries exploit returns by pooling and tranching that are the
essences of securitization.
First, nancial intermediaries purchase loans from banks and pool them. They di-
versify their portfolios so they purchase N types of loans evenly. In the next period,
n 2 f0; 1; 2;    ; Ng types of loans in the collateral could default. Therefore, the expected
rate of return of the collateral, E(Rc), is:
E(Rc) =
NX
n=0

N   n
N

Rm +
n
N
Q

Pr (n) :
Pr (n) is the probability that n types of loans default. Note  and  affect Pr (n).31
Next, nancial intermediaries issue two types of securities backed by the pool of loans:
The payoffs of these two securities are contingent on the payoff of the collateral. I call one
type of securities as Debt tranche32 and the other type as Equity tranche. The following
30Banks are also involved in the securitization market. However, banks act mechanically which originate
loans to borrowers with an exogenous interest rate Rm and sell them to nancial intermediaries. There is no
optimization for banks.
31It is difcult to obtain an analytical expression of Pr (n) due to the complexity of solving multiple
integrals of correlated multivariate normal distributions. Instead, I solve it numerically using Matlab codes
developed by Alan Genz, a professor of Mathematics at Washington State University. These are available at
http://www.math.wsu.edu/faculty/genz/homepage.
32In the real world, market participants in securitization markets often call each class of securitized asset
as a "tranche". Tranche is originally a French word which means "slice" in English.
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Figure 2-2: payoff schedules of each type of the securitized assets
formulas show the return structures:
Rd =
8><>: DN n
N
Rm +
n
N
Q
if n  n
if n  n + 1;
Re =
8><>:
N n
N
Rm +
n
N
Q D
0
if n  n
if n  n + 1;
(2.2)
N   n   1
N
Rm +
n + 1
N
Q < D  N   n

N
Rm +
n
N
Q:
Rd and Re are the rates of return of Debt tranche and Equity tranche normalized by the
principal of the collateral. D can be interpreted as the notional value of Debt tranche.33
Figure 2-2 visualizes the return structures. As the payoff structures above show, nancial
intermediaries issue different classes of securities from a pool of homogenous loans. The
returns of the securitized assets are contingent on the total payoff of underlying assets. In
this model, Debt tranche has a seniority to be paid out: Equity tranche rst cover the losses
of underlying assets and the notional value of Debt tranche, D, is secured if n  n. Debt
tranche begins to suffer losses only when the number of default gets large.
Finally, nancial intermediaries sell Debt tranche to investors while they keep holding
Equity tranche. This structure is assumed in this model but it is advantageous to nancial
33In relation with D, we call n the attachment point of Debt tranche.
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intermediaries when investors underestimate (; ): Financial intermediaries can lower D
as investors tend to overestimate the expected return of Debt tranche. This implies more
return is allocated to Equity tranche. When there are uninformed investors in the market,
nancial intermediaries can be beneted by holding Equity tranche. The securitiy design
is crucial to allocate more returns to informed agents.
Now, I introduce the decision mechanisms of investors and nancial intermediaries:
~E(Rd)
(1  l) = D
nX
n=0
fPr(n) + nX
n=n+1

N   n
N
Rm +
n
N
Q
fPr(n)  R; (2.3)
E(Re)
l
=
nX
n=0

N   n
N
Rm +
n
N
Q D

Pr(n)  Rf : (2.4)
l 2 [0; 1] denotes the ratio of the principal of Equity tranche to the principal of the collateral.
I assume that the sum of the principal of Debt tranche and Equity tranche is equal to the
principal of the collateral. l is thus the leverage from nancial intermediary's point of
view. I assume l is exogenous throughout the model. ~E(Rd)=(1   l) is the expected
rate of return of Debt tranche given the subjective belief (~; ~). fPr(n) is the subjective
probability that n types of loans default. I assume investors are risk neutral. Investors thus
require ~E(Rd)=(1   l) to be at least as much as R, the market interest rate.34 Similarly,
nancial intermediaries require E(Re)=l, the expected rate of return of Equity tranche, to
be at least as much as Rf . I assume Rf > R. Rf   R represents the excess return that
nancial intermediaries require to be willingly to hold Equity tranche in a reduced form
way. Remember that Equity tranche is risky in the sense that it pays positive returns only
when n is small.
Table 2-1 shows the sensitivity of the expected returns of the securitized assets to in-
vestor's belief on the default risks. Column 3 assumes that investors have true information,
(; ). Column 4 and 5 show the extent to which nancial intermediaries are able to re-
34We can easily verify that there exists unique D such that (2.3) holds with equality under the assumption
Rm  R(1  l).
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description symbol true information low ~ low ~; ~ low ~; ~;Q
default risk, true (; ) (0:2; 0:8) (0:2; 0:8) (0:2; 0:8) (0:2; 0:8)
default risk, belief (~; ~) (0:2; 0:8) (0:1; 0:8) (0:1; 0:2) (0:1; 0:2)
recovery rate Q 0:9 0:9 0:9 0:85
attachment point D 0:920 0:919 0:918 0:918
expected return, Collateral E(Rc) 1:02 1:02 1:02 1:01
expected return, Debt E(Rd)= (1  l) 1:02 1:019 1:018 1:013
expected return, Equity E(Re)=l 1:02 1:029 1:033 0:984
I set R = 1:02, Rm = 1:05, l = 0:1 and N = 5. These parameters are unchanged throughout this experiment.
Table 2-1: Sensitivities of the expected return of securitized assets to default risks
allocate the return of collateral in favor of them when investors underestimate the default
risks, i.e. ~ <  and ~ < .35 In this case, D is set lower than what it is in the case
of no information asymmetry. Consequently, nancial intermediaries are able to raise the
expected return of Equity tranche. In Column 6, I illustrate that the high expected return
of Equity tranche blows out when Q declines. We can see that the decline of Q directly
lowers E(Re) by (2.4). There is also an indirect effect through which a decline in Q raises
D though the effect is tiny in this numerical example.
The above exercise illustrates that securitization is a way to reallocate the return of
the collateral when investors are uninformed. Note, however, pooling alone doesn't give
an opportunity to reallocate returns. If nancial intermediaries sold a fractional claim to
the collateral to investors, then the expected return of residual claims, which are held by
nancial intermediaries, would be still the same as that of the collateral. Investors would
overestimate the expected return of the collateral, however the mismeasurement would not
reect to the return of securities which nancial intermediaries hold. Instead, the key lies in
tranching. Financial intermediaries actively reallocate the return of collateral by tailoring
security design.
35The sum of the expected return of Debt tranche and Equity tranche must coincide with the expected
return of the collateral, that is (1  l)E(Rd) + lE(Re) = E(Rc).
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The ability to reallocate the return may be conned by the uctuation of parameters
which are common knowledge to everyone. In the above exercise, Q functions in this way.
Later, I relate Q with HPI which is determined endogenously. The endogenous movement
of Q is the source of variation in the protability of securitization in my model.
2.2.2 Dynamic optimizations and the housing market.
Borrowers
Borrowers maximize the discounted sum of the period utility:
max ~Et
1X
s=0
s tb U (cb;s; hb;s) ; (2.5)
U(cb; hb) = cb + b lnhb:
Their period utility function is the sum of the utility derived from consumption, cb, and
housing service that is proportional to the log of housing stock, hb. b can be interpreted
as the weight attached to housing service. b is the discount rate of borrowers. I assume
b < Rm, where Rm is the loan interest rate. The low discount rate ensures that borrowers
accumulate positive debt outstandings in equilibrium. ~Et is the expectation operator given
borrower's assessment on the default risks. I assume that borrowers have the same belief
as investors.36
The ow of funds of borrowers is:
cb;t + qthb;t+1    

hb;t+1
hb;t
  1
2
hb;t  Bb;t+1 = At(hb;t; Bb;t; nt): (2.6)
In the RHS, At(hb;t; Bb;t; nt) is the resources available to borrowers. It is a function of
the existing housing stock, debt outstandings, Bb;t, and the default rate, nt=N . A more
36Borrowers must have optimistic belief to generate booms. If not, borrowers forsee that the securitization
is not protable for nancial intermediaries and they internalize the collapse of the securitization market.
Difference in belief between investors and borrowers is non essential. All that matter is their belief deviate
from the true stochastic process.
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detailed explanation on At is described below. The LHS is the net expenditure. Borrowers
consume, choose the new level of housing stock and the new level of borrowing. The house
price when they acquire new housing stock is denoted by qt. When they change the level
of housing stock, they pay the quadratic adjustment cost, denoted by  

hb;t+1
hb;t
  1
2
hb;t.
 measures the magnitude of this cost. Because borrowers hate the uctuation of housing
service while they do not the uctuation of consumption, they adjust their housing stock
to a desired level very quickly without the adjustment cost. As we will see in the section
2.3.3, the gradual adjustment of housing stock is necessary to have sustained periods of
economic booms induced by securitization.37
One more constraint that borrowers face is the borrowing limit:
Bb;t+1  qthb;t+1: (2.7)
As b < Rm, borrowers may borrow innite amount without the borrowing limit.
Taking into account (2.5), (2.6) and (2.7) together, the Bellman equation of borrower's
problem can be written as:
Vb (hb;t; Bb;t; nt) = max
hb;t+1;Bb;t+1
8<:At   qthb;t+1 +  

hb;t+1
hb;t
  1
2
hb;t +Bb;t+1
+b lnhb;t + b ~Eb;t (Vb (hb;t+1; Bb;t+1; nt+1))
9=; ;(2.8)
s:t Bb;t+1  qthb;t+1:
(hb;t; Bb;t; nt) summarizes the states of borrowers.38 The exogenous state in this economy
is the default rate, nt=N . Here I assume that borrowing,Bb is available to borrowers.39 This
37Iacoviello (2009) argues that the quadratic adjustment cost is inappropriate to describe the cost associated
with the housing transactions. I simply state that the quadratic adjustment cost is a short-cut to generate sticky
aggregate housing investment in the real world.
38In equilibrium, (hb;t; Bb;t; nt) also summarizes the states of the aggregate economy. See detailed expla-
nation in Appendix B.
39Indeed, this formula supposes that borrowing is available in any subsequent periods. We must assume
that (~; ~) is consistent with this supposition. That is (2.4) should be satised in any reachable states in the
future under borrower's belief.
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is the case when nancial intermediaries intermediate borrowing demand and investment
supply. As I describe the nancial intermediary's behavior later, they may not intermediate
the nancial needs. In this case, their problem is simplied as:
V^b (hb;t; 0; nt) = max
hb;t+1
8><>:
At   qthb;t+1 +  

hb;t+1
hb;t
  1
2
hb;t
+b lnhb;t + b ~Eb;t

V^b (hb;t+1; 0; nt+1)

9>=>; : (2.9)
Because borrowers have no access to borrowing, Bb = 0, the new value function, V^b,40 is
distinguished from the former one, Vb.
To complete the problem, I briey describe the formula of At(hb;t; Bb;t; nt). The re-
source of borrowers consists of followings: Wage payment to their labor and the value
of existing housing stock. The loan repayment is a subtraction to their resource. Among
them, the most important assumption is unemployment possibility which has one-to-one
relationship with loan defaults.
To be clear, unemployment is solely an exogenous process to borrowers: every bor-
rowers are willing to supply a unit of labor but job opportunities are randomly assigned
in each period. A more detailed explanation of the unemployment process follows in sec-
tion 2.2.3, however, an important consequence is that unemployed borrowers are unable to
repay debt therefore they default. In this case, the re sale of their housing stocks takes
place. These are the twists in otherwise a standard dynamic housing choice problem a la
Iacoviello (2005, 2009).
Given the employment opportunity, borrower's ability to repay loan is:
min fw + ~qthb;t; RmBb;tg if employed,
min f~qthb;t; RmBb;tg if unemployed.
40There should be a time, say  , such that borrowers have positive existing debt outstanding Bb: > 0
but new borrowing is not available. We thus need to dene one more value function which is just for the
transition period. I relegate this to Appendix B.
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w is the wage which is assumed to be xed over time. ~qt is the re sale price of house
which conceptually differs from the normal house price, qt. I assume borrowers rst use
wage to repay debts. After they exhaust wage, they begin to sell existing housing stock to
repay remaining obligations. If wage is sufciently high and if the re sale price of house
is sufciently low, employed borrowers repay fully while unemployed borrowers default
and sell their entire housing stocks.41
Because of the employment status, borrowers become heterogeneous ex post even
though they are homogeneous ex ante. To deal with a homogeneous agent problem, I
assume that there exists a perfect insurance regarding after-loan-repayment wealth: after
each borrower repays whatever amount possible, their wealth is redistributed and equal-
ized. Remember that I assumed that borrowers were homogeneous in terms of the amount
of borrowing in section 2.2.1. Without the perfect insurance, borrowers would become
heterogeneous in one period and the amount of borrowing would vary.
Ultimately, At(hb;t; Bb;t; nt) denotes the equally redistributed wealth. Because wealth
is redistributed, the default rate, nt=N , matters for per capita wealth. I relegate the complete
explanation of the wealth redistribution process in Appendix B.
Investors
Investors live two periods. The population of investors relative to borrowers is Ni. I
call them "young" when they live in the rst period and "old" when they live in the second
period. Their objective function is:
max cy;t + y lnhy;t +  ~Et [co;t+1 + o lnho;t+1] : (2.10)
41I assume that the market for new loans is not open at the time borrowers repay debts. Together with the
overlapping structure of investors which I describe below, this assumption lets us avoid complications which
arise from heterogeneous expectations on HPI which has one-to-one relationship with the recovery rate of
defaulted loans. In principle, I need homogeneous expectation on the recovery rate even agents have different
information on the default risks, (; ). A more detailed explanation is found in section 2.2.3.
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As borrowers, they derive utility from consumption and housing service. The subscript y
stands for the young and the subscript o stands for the old. For example, co;t+1 denotes
the consumption of old investors at time t + 1. y and o are the weights attached to
housing service in each period.  is their discount rate. As in borrower's problem, ~Et is
the expectation operator given investor's subjective belief on the stochastic employment
opportunities.
Old investors die after they consume. In each period, a new cohort of investors of the
same population is born. That is the population of investors is xed at every periods. When
old investors die, the new born young investors inherit the wealth of old investors, which is
of the form of housing stock. Their ow of funds is thus:
cy;t +Bd;t+1 + qthy;t = w + qtho;t; (2.11)
co;t+1 + ~qt+1ho;t+1 = Rt+1Bd;t+1 + ~qt+1hy;t:
The rst line is the budget constraint of young investors and the second line is that of old
investors. When they are young, they obtain wage by supplying a unit of labor, consume,
cy;t, invest in Debt tranche, Bd;t+1, and decide the new level of housing stock, hy;t. Young
investors trade housing stock after the re sale of housing stock is over.42 The return of
Debt tranche realizes in the next period when young investors become old. The return,
Rt+1, is contingent on nt. At the same time, old investors trade housing stock further.
They absorb the re sale supply of housing stock which defaulted borrowers release to the
market. The housing stock at the end of life is denoted by ho;t+1.
42They trade housing stock with borrowers who have repaid their debts and whose wealth is already redis-
tributed.
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The FOCs of investors' problem are the followings:
1 =  ~Et (Rt+1) ;
qt =
y
hy;t
+  ~Et (~qt+1) ; (2.12)
~qt+1 =
o
ho;t+1
:
The rst equation is the Euler equation on Debt tranche holdings. Investor's belief matters
as the subjective expected return, ~Et (Rt+1), enters in the equation. By the rst equation,
any assets must offer the rate of return equal to 1= in investor's expectation. Therefore
1= is actually the market interest rate, R, in equilibrium. It is consistent with the risk
neutral assumption in the securitization model above.43
By now we are able to see more detailed distinction between q and ~q. When investors
are young, they trade housing stock with borrowers who already repay debt obligations.
At this point, the re sale of housing stock is over. They thus trade house with the normal
house price, q. At the beginning of the next period, old investors, who are used to be young
one period ago, further trade housing stock. Here, I assume that old investors absorb the
re sale supply of housing stocks with house price being the re sale price, ~q.
Financial intermediaries
There are measure one nancial intermediaries who are innitely lived. They obtain
endowment wf in each period. If (2.4) is satised, nancial intermediaries provide lending
to borrowers by issuing the securitized assets. In this case, the fraction l of borrower's loan
is ultimately nanced by nancial intermediary's endowment.44 Otherwise, they step away
from the securitization market and consume all of the endowment. This implies borrowers
are not able to borrow. I denote cf;t and Be;t+1 as consumption and investment to Equity
43This implies their saving demand (lending supply) curve becomes at at ~Et (Rt+1) = 1=i.
44I assume ef is large enough so that nancial intermediaries can contribute portion l of the outstandings
of the loans.
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tranche respectively.
One important assumption is that borrowers and investors learn the true parameters,
(; ), immediately at the rst time nancial intermediaries withdraw from the securitiza-
tion market. And I assume that nancial intermediaries will not return to the securitization
market thereafter. This is a strong and crucial assumption to have crises in this model.
Although I do not introduce a systematic learning of the parameters, this assumption could
be justied in the following way: Borrowers and investors put zero probability on the event
that nancial intermediaries withdraw from the securitization market under certain opti-
mistic belief (~; ~). That is they think (2.4) should be satised whatever possible paths the
economy undergoes given their information. Then, the fact that nancial intermediaries
withdraw from the market has borrowers and investors reconsider the protability of the
securitization. Eventually, they revise their belief and I assume that they somehow learn
the true parameters (; ) at once. Moreover, it is possible that (2.4) is no longer satised
once investors learn the true parameters: Financial intermediaries have to raiseD under no
information asymmetry. This lowers the expected return of Equity tranche. If the decline
of the expected return were large enough, nancial intermediaries would have no incentive
to return to the securitization market.
2.2.3 Incorporating the securitization market
In each period, the securitization in section 2.2.1 is incorporated into the dynamic econ-
omy in section 2.2.2. However, we must clear several issues. First of all, we must specify
the unemployment process and relate it to defaults of borrowers. Second the recovery rate,
Q, should be endogenize so that we fully utilize the dynamic model in this chapter.
For the rst issue, I model unemployment as a proxy of default. In section 2.2.1, I
dene (2.1) as "default process". In the dynamic model in section 2.2.2, I redene it as
the exogenous unemployment process for borrowers: the latent factor Xn governs the job
opportunities of type n borrowers. If Xn   1 (), type n borrowers are unemployed.
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As assumed in section 2.2.1, investors and borrowers have subjective belief on the para-
meters (; ). It is denoted as (~; ~). Additionally, I assume that (Zt1; "1;t1;    ; "N;t1) are
independent of (Zt2; "1;t2;    ; "N;t2) for 8t1 6= t2. And I parameterize the model such that
unemployed borrowers default.45
For the second issue, the equivalence between unemployment and default helps to relate
HPI with the recovery rate, Q. The maximum amount that unemployed borrowers can
repay is the re sale value of their housing stocks, ~qt+1hb;t+1. Assuming that the borrowing
constraint (2.7) binds in equilibrium, we can express borrower's housing stock as hb;t+1 =
Bb;t+1=qt. Combining these two, we can express the recovery rate as q;t+1  ~qt+1=qt
which is determined endogenously in the equilibrium. As such, the endogenous uctuation
of HPI is the key determinant of the protability of the securitization in this model (See
(2.4) with replacing Q with q;t+1).
In (2.12), ~qt+1 depends only on the variables at time t + 1. By this fact we can avoid
complications which arise from heterogeneous HPI expectations. Suppose investors are in-
nitely lived and suppose new borrowing is allowed when borrowers repay existing debts.
In this case, there would be no distinction between q and ~q as in the standard housing
DSGE model. Then future house price, qt+1 would depend on hb;t+2; hb;t+3 and so on as it
would be the discounted sum of the future ow of the marginal utility of housing service.
Because investors and nancial intermediaries have different information on the unem-
ployment risks, they may have different views on the protability of the securitization in
the future. This might be reected to different views on future housing allocations because
securitization provides borrowers with resources to purchase home. Then there would be
a disagreement on the expectation of qt+1 which would complicate the solution. By the
non-standard overlapping generation structure for investors, we can guarantee that there is
45It is not immediate that unemployment is equivalent to default. Even a borrower is unemployed, he
could have enough wealth to repay his debt if ~qthb;t  RmBb;t. I carefully parameterize the model so
that unemployed borrowers default while employed borrowers have sufcient resources to repay debts (w +
~qthb;t  RmBb;t) in equilibrium. In what follows, I assume that the parameters of this economy satisfy this
criterion.
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no disagreement on q;t+1.
2.2.4 Equilibrium
In this economy, consumption good is produced by labor in one-to-one relation:
yt = ALt:
Assuming perfect competition, w = A. In equilibrium, Lt is the sum of labor supply by
investors and borrowers which is determined exogenously. Investors supply a xed amount
of labor while borrowers supply labor stochastically.
The equilibrium is an allocation of fhb;s+1; hy;s; ho;s+1; Bb;s+1; Bd;s+1; Be;s+1g 1s=t ,
fhb;s+1; hy;s; ho;s+1g1s= , the house price fqs; ~qsg1s=t, the realization of the unemployment
fnsg1s=t, and the threshold time  associated with the sustainability of securitization given
the initial state (hb;t; Bb;t) such that
1. For s     1, (hb;s+1; Bb;s+1) solve borrower's maximization problem (2.8) given
the sequence of house prices that borrowers presume. And (hy;s; ho;s+1; Bd;s+1) solve
investor's maximization problem (2.10). In this phase, nancial intermediaries issue
the securitized assets and Be;s+1 > 0. During this phase, borrowers and investors
have subjective belief (~; ~).
2. At s =  (2.4) is violated for the rst time. Financial intermediaries withdraw from
the market and borrowers and investors learn (; ). A rescue plan is implemented to
save borrowers if necessary (See Appendix B to understand why we need the rescue
plan and how I implement it). For s   , nancial intermediaries no longer issue the
securitized assets.
3. For s > ; hb;s+1 solves borrower's maximization problem (2.9) given the sequence
of the house prices. (hy;s; ho;s+1) solves investor's maximization problem (2.10) with
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restricting Bd;s+1 = 0. In this phase Be;s+1 = 0.
4. Market clearing conditions are satised:
the good market : cb;s + cy;s + co;s + cf;s =
ns
N
+Ni

y + we
the housing market : hb;s+1 +Nihy;s = h
the securitization market : Bb;s+1 = NiBd;s+1 +Be;s+1
To be precise, there remain exogenous variables which DSGE models usually treat en-
dogenous: borrower's employment is solely governed by the exogenous stochastic process.
The loan interest rate, Rm, and the leverage ratio, l, also remain exogenous. The loan in-
terest rate and the leverage affect the return of securitized assets if they are endogenize.
Because making them endogenous complicates the solution of the model a lot, I leave them
exogenous. The markets clear given these exogenous components. Although the price of
loans is exogenous, the assumptions in this model, such as the leverage is exougenous, help
us to clear all markets.
The economy is divided into two phases: One is the periods when nancial intermedi-
aries engage in securitization and the other is the periods when they keep away from it. I
refer the former periods to the securitization regime and the latter to the non-securitization
regime. Let  denote the threshold period that the economy changes from the securitization
regime to the non-securitization regime: In periods s  ft; t+ 1;       1g, nancial inter-
mediaries issue the securitized assets. Thereafter nancial intermediaries keep away from
the market.  can be1 or t, i.e. one of the two regimes continues entire periods. However
it is never possible that the securitization regime follows after the non-securitization regime
by the assumptions above.
The periods s     1 are said to be a boom phase if  > t under the belief (~; ~)
but  = t if borrowers and investors knew true parameters. Intuitively, a boom is a phase
when borrowers accumulate debt outstandings and increase housing demand because of
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the mismeasurements of the default risks. The period  is said to be a bust period, or
equivalently a crisis period, if a boom phase unfolds at time t but the incentive condition
(2.4) is violated for the rst time at time  . At time  , nancial intermediaries suddenly
withdraw from the securitization market and borrower's borrowing demand is no longer
nanced. At this period, borrowers are forced to adjust their consumption-housing plan.
2.3 Model implications
The question that I would like to address in this section is whether the optimistic belief,
(~; ~), induces boom-and-burst cycles in the securitization market and the housing market
under reasonable parameterizations. To check this, rst I parameterize the model to match
some of the moments of actual data. Then I examine the properties of equilibrium to get
an intuition about the conditions that crises occur. Finally I simulate the model and check
whether a crisis emerges in the model economy.
2.3.1 Parameterizations
The parameters in this model are (; ; ~; ~;Rm; l; b; ; w; b; y; o; h;N;Ni; Rf ;  ).
The time frequency of this model is annual. Table 2-2 summarizes the parameterization. I
target many of the parameters so that the data generated by the model is consistent with data
in U.S. during 2000s when subprime mortgage securitization grew rapidly. I set  = 0:98
which implies the annual real interest rate is about 2%. This is consistent with the real
interest rate imputed by 10-year Treasury ination-protected securities (TIPS).Rm, the real
loan interest rate, is set to 5%. This is consistent with the subprime mortgage interest rates
shown in Nedauld and Scherlund (2009); the nominal interest rates of subprime mortgages
that were securitized were around 7  8:5%. Assuming that expected ination is 2~3%,
which is consistent with the average U.S. ination in past 10 years, the real interest rate of
subprime mortgages can be approximated by 5%. In this model, we can interpret the loans
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parameter description value parameter description value
 unemployment probability (true) 0:125 w wage 0:75
 unemployment correlation (true) 0:8 b housing weight, borrowers 0:1
~ unemployment probability (belief) 0:075 y housing weight, young investors 0:025
~ unemployment correlation (belief) 0:2 o housing weight, old investors 1:0
Rm real loan interest rate 1:05 h housing supply 2:5
l principal share, Equity tranche 0:19 Ni population of investors 2
b discount rate, borrowers 0:98 Rf required return, FIs 1:05
 discount rate, investors 0:9  housing adjustment cost 2:5
Table 2-2: Parameterization of the model
as subprime mortgages because they are collateralized by housing stocks and they have
high default probability. Together with b = 0:9,46 the calibration ofRm implies borrowers
actually borrow in the equilibrium.
The set of parameters (w; b; y; o; h;Ni) targets housing wealth-output ratio. Dur-
ing 2000s, this ratio averaged 1:25 according to the data released by Bureau of Economic
Analysis. The set of parameters implies the housing wealth-output ratio in the model
reaches to 1:25 when the economy reaches to the steady state of the securitization regime.
The fact that there are many more tranches than two in typical securitization challenges
the parameterization of l, the share of Equity tranche's principal. In U.S. rating compa-
nies give credit ratings to collateralized debt obligations (CDO). In this chapter, I assume
that Debt tranche represents AAA rated tranches in subprime mortgage securitization in
U.S. According to Nedauld and Scherlund (2009), the principal share of the AAA rated
tranches oated around 0:75~0:85. In this parameterization, I set 1   l = 0:79. Rf is set
to be greater than the market interest rate. As described in section 2.2.1, the excess return,
Rf  R, captures the compensation that nancial intermediaries require for the riskiness of
Equity tranche in a reduced form way. The excess return is 300bps in this parameterization.
Ashcraft and Schuremann (2008) calculate that the spread between BBB rated tranches and
46This value is roughly consistent with the calibration of impatient households in Iacoviello (2005, 2009).
67
AAA rated tranches is about 1000bps as of July 24 2007. Though the data was retrieved in
the midst of the subprime crisis and I don't have the data before the crisis unfolded, 300bps
is not an unacceptable order.
(; ; ~; ~) are key parameters in this model but they are the parameters whose in-
formation is hard to obtain. I simply assume that (; ) = (0:125; 0:8). The marginal
probability that a borrower loses job is much higher than the national unemployment rate
in U.S. This captures the notion that borrowers in this model are quite risky. I assume
(~; ~) = (0:075; 0:2) which implies borrowers and investors have an optimistic view on the
default risks.
2.3.2 The properties of the solution
The policy functions of the problem (2.8) under equilibrium house prices shape the
dynamics of the securitization regime. The policy functions are denoted by hb;t+1 =
gh(hb;t; Bb;t; nt) and Bb;t+1 = gb(hb;t; Bb;t; nt).47
To illustrate the solution properties, I show the case ofN = 2, the simplest case possible
in this model. With the parameters above, Equity tranche earns strictly positive return when
n = 0 or 1:Within these two cases, HPI affects the return of Equity tranche when n = 1.
Figure 2-3 shows the housing choice of borrowers, gh(hb;t; Bb;t; nt). I x Bb;t in this
gure and I focus on how borrowers choose the level of housing stock when hb;t and nt
change. When nt = 0, that is when no borrower defaults, the policy function crosses the
45 degree line only once from above. When, nt = 2, that is when every borrowers default,
the policy function is on the 45 degree line until the existing housing stock gets sufciently
large.
The policy function above implies that borrowers increase their housing stock when the
level of the existing housing stock is small. However, they are allowed to do so only when
47The method of computing the equilibrium prices and the policy functions can be seen in the Appendix
B.
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Figure 2-3: The policy function on housing: gh(hb;t; Bb;t; nt)
the default rate is low. When many borrowers default, e.g. nt = 2, per-capita wealth is
close to zero and they are not afford to change the level of housing stock by paying the
housing adjustment cost. All that they can do is to maintain the existing level of housing
stock.48 Intuitively, they manage to live in the same house by accepting low consumption
when the per-capita wealth is small.
Figure 2-4 shows the policy function on borrowing, gb(hb;t; Bb;t; nt), along with the
choice of house value, gh(hb;t; Bb;t; nt) multiplied by qt. The horizontal line represents the
existing level of housing stock and the vertical line represents the choice of new borrowing
as well as new housing value. As the existing level of housing stock increases, borrowers
increase the amount of borrowing. Moreover, the borrowing constraint binds upto a certain
level of housing stock: the amount of borrowing coincides with the value of housing stock
until the economy reaches to the steady state from below.49 Recall that the borrowing
constraint must bind to claim that the HPI = Q. This condition is satised whenever the
economy starts below the steady state of the securitization regime.
48By the form of the borrowing constraint, (2.7), it is possible to maintain the same level of housing stock
without paying the housing adjustment cost.
49The threshold (dashed line in Figure 2-4) is exactly the steady state of the securitization regime.
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2.3.3 Simulation
Figure 2-5 shows the simulation result. The lower-middle gure shows the simulated
path of the unemployment rate of borrowers (not the aggregate economy).50 It is based
on random draws of the latent factors in (2.1). I assume N = 6 in this simulation. The
simulation result is not sensitive to the choice of N .51
The other gures in Figure 2-5 show the paths of endogenous variables. The solid lines
plot the actual paths of the economy while the dotted lines plot the paths of the economy
had the securitization regime continued indenitely. Borrowers increase housing stock for
the rst several years when they begin with a low level of housing stock. On this course,
borrowers accumulate debt outstandings due to the expansion of the borrowing capacity.
Borrower's housing stock suddenly drops after 4 years (see the solid line in the upper-
left gure). At this point, the expected return of Equity tranche falls short of Rf , the
50With the calibration, the economy wide unemployment rate is at most 33%.
51What matters is the expectation of q;t+1 in the states for which q;t+1 affects the return of Equity
tranche; by (2.4), we can see that the time t assessment on one-period ahead recovery rates in the states
nt+1 < n
 is important for the protability of securitization. To this end, what matters is the choice of
(; ; ~; ~) not N .
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Figure 2-5: A simulation result
required return of nancial intermediaries, for the rst time (See the lower-left gure in
Figure 2-5). Financial intermediaries withdraw from the securitization market and a cri-
sis unfolds at that point. Borrowers and investors revise (~; ~). By the assumption, they
learn the true parameters immediately. Under new information, the securitization is no
longer protable for nancial intermediaries. They thus keep away from the securitiza-
tion. Borrowers are forced to adjust their housing stock substantially because they are no
longer allowed to borrow.52 Thereafter, borrowers accumulate housing stock gradually, but
it never reaches to the level once it was the securitization regime.
HPI is volatile and it is correlated with the unemployment state while the economy is in
the securitization regime: When realized n is small, the realized HPI is high. The housing
re sale drives the uctuation of HPI: by (2.12), the re sale price ~qt+1 relative to the normal
52See the detailed procedure of housing stock adjustment at crises in Appendix B.
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Time t, t+1,…,τ-1 τ τ+1,τ+2,…
Regime Securitization regime Securitization regimecollapses
Non-securitization
regime
Investor's perception
on the default risks Own belief
Learn
true parameters True parameters
Borrower's
housing stock Increase over time Plunge
Increase but never
 restore previous level
HPI expectation Decline over time flat flat
Return on
Equity tranche Above required return Below required return Below required return
Table 2-3: The ow of events and the direction of the dynamics.
price qt is high when the re sale supply is small, that is when n is small.53 This relationship
disappears after nancial intermediaries withdraw from the securitization market. Because
the housing re sale no longer takes place in this regime, there is no variation in ~qt+1.
Table 2-3 summarizes the entire chronology of the boom-and-bust cycle. The boom
emerges when investors have optimistic views on the default risks of loans. In this periods,
nancial intermediaries can enjoy excessively high return from Equity tranche. However,
a magma accumulates at the same time: the expected HPI declines over time as the speed
of expansion slows down. Eventually, the expected HPI hits the threshold that the expected
return of Equity tranche is break even with Rf . At this point, nancial intermediaries
suddenly stop issuing the securitized assets and a crisis unfolds.
A negative shock, high unemployment, is not necessary to trigger the crisis. In fact,
the crisis unfolds when n = 0 in this simulation. All that matter is one-period-ahead
expectation of HPI in the states where it affects the return of Equity tranche. Figure 2-6
visualizes this claim. The upper-left gure shows the path of the expected return of Equity
tranche. It declines over time. This corresponds to the decline of HPI in states where it
matters for the return of Equity tranche (see the two gures in the bottom row of Figure
53To have high HPI during securitization regime, as is observed in U.S, we need to have a series of good
draws of the latent factors.
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Figure 2-6: House price ination and the expected return of Equity tranche
2-6. I only show the cases when n = 1 and 3 but the same argument holds for the all
relevant states). After 4 years, the HPI is no-longer high enough to sustain the expected
return of Equity tranche above Rf .
If borrowers knew the nancial intermediary's incentive truly, then borrowers might
foresee that the securitization regime would collapse at some point in the future.54 How-
ever, borrowers overestimate the expected return of Equity tranche under their belief. The
upper-right gure in Figure 2-6 plots borrower's view on the expected return of Equity
tranche. Borrowers presume that it is well above Rf . So, borrowers (as well as investors)
never anticipate that the securitization regime collapses.55 Borrowers, who anticipate the
54This implies the Bellman equation (2.8) is not appropriate to describe the problem of borrowers; (2.8)
assumes the securitization regime continues indenitely.
55To justify this claim, it is not sufcient to check the expected return of Equity tranche in realized states.
We must check it in any states that are reachable given the initial state (hb;t; Bb;t). Here reachable states
mean the states that the economy can arrive with non-zero probability.
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securitization regime continues, plan to accumulate housing stocks and debt outstandings
further as dotted lines in Figure 2-5.
2.3.4 A counter factual exercise
This section demonstrates the importance of the assumptions made in this chapter. I
conduct a following experiment: I remove one of the two crucial assumptions, a devia-
tion from rational expectation and the availability of securitization, and check whether the
expected return of securities that nancial intermediaries would hold exceeds Rf .
In Figure 2-7, at each point of time, I assume that the economy begins with the housing
stock and debt outstandings that borrowers choose in the simulation in the section 2.3.3.
The line with circle marker shows the expected return of Equity tranche when investors
know the true default risks, (; ). The line with square marker shows the expected return
of securities when securitization is not available to nancial intermediaries. In the latter
case, I assume nancial intermediaries can pool the loans but cannot tranche the claims.
Hence, the expected return shown with the square marker is the expected return of the
fractional claim to the pool of the loans. The latter exercise demonstrates the importance
of tranching.
It is the combination of the two assumptions that gives nancial intermediaries an op-
portunity to obtain high return. When returning to rational expectation, that is when in-
vestors know (; ) truly, nancial intermediaries have to give higher return to investors.
This lowers the expected return of Equity tranche. When tranching is not available, -
nancial intermediaries have no way to reallocate the return of the collateral. In this case,
information structure is irrelevant for the securities that nancial intermediaries would hold.
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2.4 Discussions
2.4.1 The mechanism of Boom and Bust
Coval et al (2009) and Heiteld (2009) suggest that securitization magnies errors in
measuring the default risks of underlying assets: Holders of junior claims are overcompen-
sated if holders of senior claims underestimate the default risks. They argue that securi-
tization of subprime mortgages grew explosively as a result of mispricings of securitized
assets.
The main contribution of this chapter is to utilize the above idea in a dynamic macro-
economic model. By deviating from rational expectation in a specic way, I attempt to
create boom-and-bust cycles in the aggregate economy. When investors mismeasure the
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default risks of underlying assets, the security design of securitized assets facilitate nanc-
ing risky lending that would not be taken place under rational expectation. Then borrowers
increase housing demand due to the extended availability of resources. The overpricing of
the securitized assets induces speculative expansions of the aggregate economy.
The evolution of HPI plays a key role to generate crises. This is consistent with recent
empirical ndings on mortgage defaults, such as Gerardi, Shapiro and Willen (2007): They
nd a statistically signicant relationship between the depreciation of house price and the
increase of the default probability of mortgages. They also nd that the impact is econom-
ically signicant. When many mortgages default due to house price depreciation, then the
return of mortgage backed securitized assets should also decline. I incorporate this nding
by connecting HPI to the recovery rate in my model.
Resource availability for borrowers uctuates during the boom-and-bust cycles in this
model. Broadly speaking, this cycle is induced by preference shocks on housing in the
word of macroeconomics. Iacoviello and Neri (2009) give one of the interpretations of the
housing preference shock as follows:
"cyclical variation in the availability of resources needed to purchase housing".
In this model, the nancial intermediary's incentive condition (2.4) endogenously de-
termines the availability of resources. The "shock" in this model is the mismeasurement of
default risks by borrowers and investors. This raises the expected return of Equity tranche
above Rf for a while thereby giving additional resources to borrowers. However, the ex-
pected return declines over time as the recovery rate gradually declines. Eventually, it falls
below Rf and borrowers are no longer able to obtain resources for home purchase. We
could generate the same kind of dynamics by uctuating housing preference parameters in
housing DSGE models.
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2.4.2 Some missing parts
Although the model in this chapter has salient features to generate securitization-induced
economic crises, it is not able to replicate some facts about the subprime crisis in U.S. First
of all, this model is not able to generate high HPI observed in the data. In Figure 2-5,
(real) HPI during the securitization regime is at most 2%. This is much lower than the peak
HPI in U.S during 2000s. Even I parameterize the model to raise HPI in the securitization
regime, the HPI in this model falls well short of the data.
Another limitation of the current version of the model is that aggregate output is exoge-
nous so as to incorporate an involved nancial market with bounded rationality. A boom
in the nancial market thus does not lead to a boom in the good market. However a small
change can x this problem. For example, assuming a neo-classical style labor market
for investors with a specic preference could generate output increases during the secu-
ritization regime.56 In the neo-classical labor market, agents increase labor supply when
the marginal utility of consumption is high. In the securitization regime, consumption of
investors tends to decline because investors allocate more resources to investment. Then
they would try to supply more labor because of the high marginal utility of consumption.
Therefore the boom in the nancial market could be transmitted to the good market.
Finally, the model economy generates no slumps after the securitization market col-
lapses. Borrowers undergo only one time adjustment at the time of crisis but economic
activities, such as housing of borrowers, immediately recover thereafter. On the contrary,
U.S. economy has slumped for sustained periods after the collapse of subprime securiti-
zation markets. A part of reason is that this model does not have the nancial accelerator
effect in the non-securitization regime, which generates persistent and amplied effects
on the aggregate output57: I assume nancial intermediaries keep away from intermediat-
56An example of the preferences might be (cy;t)v

 l(
l   ly;t)
1 v
+ y lnhy;t for young investors. We
can show that this preserves the risk neutral assumption with respect to investment while making the labor
supply inversely related to their consumption.
57Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1998) is a representative model.
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ing nancial needs of borrowers. With this setting, there is no way to exert the nancial
accelerator effect in the non-securitization regime.
2.5 Conclusion
We have seen increasing popularity of securitization to nance mortgages in U.S. The
practice started with prime mortgages which the government agencies called Freddie Mac
and Fannie May have securitized. Securitization eventually reached its arms to subprime
mortgages and this has been said to an ideal way to deliver home to every Americans:
Securitization enables investors to hold a class of safe assets which are collateralize by
risky mortgages. And this enhanced the home ownership of households who have not been
eligible to acquire mortgages. Indeed, there is virtue of securitization as DeMarzo (2005)
argues.58 However, the accuracy of information on underlying assets is much important
when evaluating the risks of securitized assets due to tranching. And there is a potential
danger that informed agents abuse their superiority. This chapter draws attention to this
danger. I illustrate that the information asymmetry regarding with the quality of underlying
assets can induce boom-and-bust cycles by securitization.
The theme that underlies in this chapter is that securitization is nothing a miracle to
generate safe assets from a pool of risky assets. To be concrete, it is true that a portion
of securitized assets can have solid returns with low default probability. However, the
riskiness of underlying assets does not change by securitization. Tranching is a specic
way to reallocate the risks of the pool of underlying assets. If securitization creates a class
of safe assets from a pool of risky assets, the residual claims should be quite risky. But this
part is masked when investors mismeasure the risks of underlying assets. In this chapter, I
assume investors have subjective belief a priori so there is no way to correct the bias. But
in reality the bias can be corrected by implementing due diligence to underlying assets in
58In DeMarzo (2005), the informed agents reveal true information on the quality of risky assets in equilib-
rium.
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various stages. At least we can take cautious views to securitized assets when we are not
condent about the information on underlying assets.
Toward future, the model must be tested to survive when we add more realistic features
both observed in the real world and studied by standard macroeconomic literature. One
possible critique to this model would be as follows: The market share of subprime mortgage
securitization in the vast U.S. nancial markets is relatively small and how such a small
market can induce large uctuations? This can be tested by including standard markets in
macroeconomic literature like bond and prime mortgage markets to my model and dene
the market size of subprime mortgages. This may weaken the forces of this model. On the
other hand, we may be able to construct a model where resonating effects among various
markets actually create more large and lingering uctuations in the economy. If so, some
defects of my model may actually dispel.
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B Appendix B
The wealth redistribution process of borrowers
After borrowers repay debts, the perfect insurance plan is executed and their wealth is
redistributed equally. In this process, the consumption good and housing stock is equally
redistributed.
~ct =
N   nt
N
max f0; w  RmBb;tg ;
~hb;t = hb;t   N   nt
N
min

hb;t;
maxfRmBb;t w;0g
~qt

  nt
N
min
n
hb;t;
RmBb;t
~qt
o
:
~ct represents the consumption good that each agent possesses after redistribution. Similarly,
~hb;t represents the level of housing stock after the redistribution. In ~ct, themax part appears
because wages of employed borrowers may not be sufcient to repay entire debts. In ~hb;t,
the min part appears because housing value may not be sufcient to repay the remaining
obligations.
At the time borrower's wealth is redistributed and borrowers make decisions on the new
level of housing stock, the re sale phase already ended. Therefore, the market value of
borrower's wealth, denoted by At(hb;t; Bb;t; nt), is:
At(hb;t; Bb;t; nt) = ~ct + qt~hb;t: (b.1)
The existence and the uniqueness of ~qt+1
We can derive the analytical solution of the re sale price of housing stock by the
overlapping generation structure in investor's problem. By the third equation of (2.12),
we can see that ~qt+1 doesn't depend on future housing stocks such as ho;t+2. Because old
investors die soon after they consume, they do not care the value of house (utility derived
from housing) in the future. To obtain the exact formula in terms of the states of this
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economy, I rst introduce the housing market clearing condition at the re sale phase.
N nt+1
N
min
n
hb;t+1;max
n
RmBb;t+1 w
~qt+1
; 0
oo
+nt+1
N
min
n
hb;t+1;
RmBb;t+1
~qt+1
o
= Ni(ho;t+1 hy;t):
(b.1) tells the re sale supply of housing stocks must be totally absorbed by old investors.
By substituting the market clearing condition into the third equation of (2.12).
~qt+1 =
oNiN   (N   nt+1)min f~qt+1hb;t+1;max fRmBb;t+1   w; 0gg
 nt+1min f~qt+1hb;t+1; RmBb;t+1g
N(h  hb;t+1)
:
This formula still include ~qt+1 in both sides. Now dene f(~qt+1) as follows.
f(~qt+1) =
oNiN   (N   nt+1)min f~qt+1hb;t+1;max fRmBb;t+1   w; 0gg
 nt+1min f~qt+1hb;t+1; RmBb;t+1g
N(h  hb;t+1)
:
We can immediately see following properties of f(~qt+1): i) f(0) > 0, ii) f(~qt+1) is con-
tinuous in ~qt+1 and iii) f(~qt+1) is weakly decreasing in ~qt+1. This implies f(~qt+1) crosses
with 45 degree line exactly only once from above in (~qt+1; f(~qt+1)) space. This proves the
existence and the uniqueness of ~qt+1. Also it is immediate that ~qt+1 > 0.
The exact solution depends on parameters (hb;t+1; Bb;t+1; nt+1; w;Rm) and it can be
expressed as follows.
~qt+1 =
8>>>><>>>>:
oNiN NRmBb;t+1+(N nt+1)w
N(h hb;t+1)
oNiN (N nt+1)(RmBb;t+1 w)
Nh (N nt+1)hb;t+1
oNi
h
if ~qt+1hb;t+1 > RmBb;t+1
if RmBb;t+1  ~qt+1hb;t+1 > RmBb;t+1   w
otherwise
:
(b.2)
Note (hb; Bb; n) describe not only the states of borrowers but also the states of the
aggregated economy: Given hb, we can uncover investors' housing stock by the housing
market clearing conditions. By the rst equation of (2.12), the supply curve of the securi-
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tized assets becomes at at ~Et (Rt+1) = 1=. This implies the demand side determines the
equilibrium borrowing.59 Finally, n is the only exogenous state in this economy.
By the second equation of (2.12), we can express qt as a function of (hb;t+1; Bb;t+1; nt+1)
too. From time t perspective, (hb;t+1; Bb;t+1)must be solved by the optimization of borrow-
ers. If we could know the policy functions associated with the borrower's problem (2.8),
then we were able to solve qt as a function of (hb;t; Bb;t; nt; nt+1). In this chapter, I solve
the policy functions numerically, therefore the exact formula of qt is not known.
The problem of borrowers at the crisis
At the end of the securitization regime, that is at the onset of time  , borrowers have to
solve a specic problem to that period. First they owe debts that is supposed to be positive.
After the loan repayment, they decide how much to consume and how much housing stock
to trade given the wealth. However, they have to do so without borrowing. From time 
onward, their borrowing ability goes down to zero. Therefore, borrower's problem at time
 can be represented as follows:
Vb; (hb; ; Bb; ; n ) = max
hb;+1
8><>:
A (hb; ; Bb; ; n )  qhb;+1 +  

hb;+1
hb;
  1
2
hb;
+b lnhb; + bEb;

V^b (hb;+1; 0; n+1)

9>=>; :
(b.3)
Vb; (hb; ; Bb; ; n ) can be solved readily if we know V^b (hb;+1; 0; n+1), the solution of the
problem (2.9).
A critical problem in (b.3) is that there may be no feasible plan hb;+1 2

0; h

such
that the non-negativity consumption constraint is satised; Increasing the level of housing
stock may not be feasible because they cannot borrow. Selling is also problematic because
they have to pay the housing adjustment cost. When A (hb; ; Bb; ; n ) is small, there may
59Precisely, we need additional conditions to verify this statement. First, young investor's wealth must be
sufciently large to nance the borrowing demand. i.e. Ni(w + qtho;t   qthy;t)  Bb;t+1 in equilibrium.
Second, nancial intermediaries must participate in the securitization market and contribute their wealth to
keep Equity tranche. I assume these conditions are met. In section 2-3, I explain what consists of the state
when nancial intermediaries withdraw from the securitization market.
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be no feasible housing plan to manage this tradeoff. To avoid this problem, I assume that
there is one time government intervention such that the government redistributes wealth
from new born investors to borrowers if:
sup
hb;+1
(
A (hb; ; Bb; ; n )  qhb;+1 +  

hb;+1
hb;
  1
2
hb;
)
< 0:
Let G be the amount of wealth redistribution from young investors to borrowers:
G =   sup
hb;+1
(
A (hb; ; Bb; ; n )  qhb;+1 +  

hb;+1
hb;
  1
2
hb;
)
: (b.4)
In other words, the rescue plan nds the scheme such that the redistribution of wealth from
investors to borrowers is minimized. In this plan, it is assumed that borrowers accept zero
consumption.
There is one more question in this rescue plan: What q we should apply in (b.4)? I
assume the government internalize q . By the house price formulas in (2.12) and by the
fact ho;+1 = hy; =
h hb;t+1
Ni
in the non securitization regime, q is expressed as follows:
q =
Ni(y + o)
h  hb;t+1
: (b.5)
The government nds:
hb;+1 = arg max
hb;+12[0;h]

A (hb; ; Bb; ; n )  qhb;+1 +  

hb;+1
hb;
  1
2
hb;

:
The government internalizes q as in (b.5). If G under hb;+1 is negative, then it imple-
ments the rescue plan. Otherwise, the market equilbrium without intervensions should exist
and the government would not step in. In the simulation in section 2.3.3, A (hb; ; Bb; ; n )
is low enough that the government actually implements the rescue plan.
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Numerical computation of the equilibrium
To solve the equilibrium, we have to evaluate the value function (2.8) and (2.9) given
the house prices, q and ~q, and we have to check whether the house prices are consistent with
the formula (2.12). Conceptually, the house price and the choice of housing and borrowing
are determined simultaneously in equilibrium. However, I compute the value function and
house price sequentially and iterate this process until the housing market clearing condition
is met.
The detailed procedure is as follows:
1. Compute Pr(n) and fPr(n). Given the parameters (; ; ~; ~;N), they can be ex-
pressed as:
2.
Pr(n) =

N
n

Pr(X1   1();    ; Xn   1(); Xn+1 >  1();    ; XN >  1());
fPr(n) = N
n

Pr(X1   1(~);    ; Xn   1(~); Xn+1 >  1(~);    ; XN >  1(~)):
I evaluate them numerically.
3. Create a discretized state space (hb; Bb; n) which approximates the true state space.
4. Analytically solve ~q for each state (hb; Bb; n) using (b.2).
5. Guess equilibrium normal house price, denoted by q0, for each state (hb; Bb; n).
6. Guess initial value function V 0b (hb; Bb; n) (for the non-securitization regime guess
V^ 0b (hb; 0; n)).
(Hereafter, I only describe the procedure in the securitization regime. The essence is
the same for the non-securitization regime.)
84
7. Compute the policy fuctions g1h(hb; Bb; n) and g1B(hb; Bb; n). Also compute the asso-
ciated new value function V 1b (hb; Bb; n) as:

g1h(hb; Bb; n); g
1
B(hb; Bb; n)

=
argmax
h0b;B
0
b
8<:A0   q0h0b +  

h0b
hb
  1
2
hb +B
0
b
+b lnhb + bEb (V
0
b (h
0
b; B
0
b; n
0))
9=; :
V 1b (hb; Bb; n) =
A0   q0g1h(hb; Bb; n) +  

g1h(hb;Bb;n)
hb
  1
2
hb + g
1
B(hb; Bb; n)
b lnhb + bEb (V
0
b (g
1
h(hb; Bb; n); g
1
B(hb; Bb; n); n
0))
:
8. Check whether V 1b and V 0b are close enough. If not repeat 6 until V mb and V
m 1
b gets
close enough. In this process, the price q0 is xed.
9. Compute the housing demand of investors given q0 by (2.12). Let gy(q0(hb; Bb; n))
be the housing demand function of investors. Check whether gmh (hb; Bb; n)+
Nigy(q
0(hb; Bb; n)) = h.
10. If excess demand in housing market, raise the price, i.e q1 > q0. If excess supply,
lower the price, i.e q1 < q0. Then repeat 6-8 with the new house price. To restart the
value function evaluation, it is convenient to start with the converged value function
under q0.
11. Repeat 9 until the housing market is close enough to clear.
12. Finally we obtain equilibrium house prices, the policy functions and the associated
value function.
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Chapter 3
Credit Availability to Multinational
Enterprises and International Business
Cycles
3.1 Introduction
One of the characteristics of globalization is growing share of international trade con-
ducted by multinational enterprises. For example, U.S. international trade associated with
multinational enterprises accounts over two-third of her total exports and about a half of her
total imports.61 While it is widely perceived that economic activities of multinational en-
terprises have non-negligible impacts on local economies, the precise mechanisms through
which trade associated with multinational enterprises affects local economies are not so
clear-cut.
This chapter examines the transmission mechanisms of international business cycles
induced by the economic activities of multinational enterprises (hereafter MNEs). The
focus of this chapter is the mechanisms through which MNEs' borrowing capacity in local
61See Kozlow (2006).
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nancial markets acts on international business cycle transmissions. I address this issue by
constructing two alternative models in which the main difference is the borrowing capacity
of MNEs: One model assumes that MNEs do not face borrowing limits while MNEs face
borrowing constraints in the other model. And I examine how the two models respond
differently to country specic productivity shocks.
This chapter is among the earliest studies that focus on the nancial positions of MNEs.
I show that the international business cycle transmissions differ dramatically in the speci-
cations of MNEs' borrowing capacity. The unique structure of my models is that MNEs
locate their production units in both countries and they raise funds in local nancial mar-
kets. MNEs locate their production units in both countries to obtain a scarce input, real
estate. Real estate is a locally traded asset. In the model with the borrowing constraints,
MNEs' borrowing capacities in each country are limited up to the value of real estate that
they own. This specication highlights the importance of the local assets for the propaga-
tion of international business cycles.
The main ndings of this chapter are followings: i) Cyclical properties of real vari-
ables heavily depend on the borrowing capacity of MNEs. ii) Real estate prices tend to
co-move regardless of the specications of the borrowing capacity but the mechanisms
differ in the specications. When MNEs' borrowing capacities are unconstrained, the sub-
stitution effect and the international risk sharing channel dominate in response to country
specic productivity shocks, and the famous international co-movement puzzle remains as
in Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992). The cross-country real estate price correlation is
also positive due to the international risk sharing channel: households, regardless of where
they live, increase local real estate demand because the international risk sharing channel
provides them with resources to invest in real estate. However, when MNEs' borrowing ca-
pacity is limited up to the value of collateral in each country, the international co-movement
puzzle is overturned: the cross-country output correlation turns to be positive and the cross-
country consumption correlation becomes much lower. With this setup, the wealth effect
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induced by MNEs investment decisions drives the result. A marginal increase in the value
of collateralizable assets has a strong multiplier effect on investment. In my model, MNEs
can enjoy this effect in both countries due to the borrowing constraints that they face in the
both countries. This incentivizes MNEs to increase investment in both countries regardless
of the origin of the shocks. The co-movement of real estate prices is also driven by the
wealth effect in this case. As Kehoe and Perri (2002) and Iacoviello and Minetti (2006)
illustrate, a key to resolve the co-movement puzzles is to introduce limited enforceability
in international nancial contracts.
This chapter expands the result of Dietrich (2004) in which he studies a static small
open economy with MNEs to a two-country dynamic general equilibrium model. He shows
a marginal increase of MNEs' wealth leads to increases in investment in home and foreign
country when there are limited enforceability problems in implementing loan contracts.
The model with borrowing constraints in this chapter is intended to expand his result to
a dynamic large country model and to study international business cycle properties. The
mechanism of the wealth effect is similar to Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). The deep root of
the wealth effect is the reduction of agency costs under asymmetric information problems
that is discussed in Holmström and Tirole (1998) and others. In terms of the form of bor-
rowing constraints, which mirrors the agency cost problem, I follow Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997) and Iacoviello (2005).
There already exist papers that examine the roles of MNEs in international business
cycle transmissions. For example, Burstein, Kurz and Tesar (2005) consider a produc-
tion chain in core regions (e.g. the U.S.) and their peripheries (e.g. NAFTA for the U.S.)
as a source of positive cross-country output correlations. They assume intermediate in-
puts produced in the core region and their periphery are more like complements. Under
this assumption, a positive productivity shock in one country enhances production in other
countries because of the complementarity. This is a novel contribution but this chapter
focuses on the characteristics of goods that we observe in trade between developed and de-
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veloping countries. Instead, I focus on nancial positions of MNEs when goods produced
in different countries are more like substitutes.62 This structure is more suitable to resolve
the international co-movement puzzle among developed countries where goods produced
in these countries are more like substitutes.
Finally, the technical aspects of my models are much owed to Iacoviello and Minetti
(2006). They build a international macro model in which local entrepreneurs borrow from
home lenders and foreign lenders. An important characteristic of their model is that the
marginal propensity of borrowing capacity to the change of collateral value is higher for
domestic borrowings than for foreign borrowings. My model retreats from the different
marginal propensities of borrowing capacity, but the setup and the solution methods are
quite similar to their model.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents two alternative models in
which the main difference is the borrowing capacity of MNEs. Section 3.3 describes the
properties of impulse response functions and the results of simulations. Section 3.4 gives
concluding remarks.
3.2 The Models
I build two alternative models in which the main difference is the borrowing capacity
of MNEs. The common features of the two models are followings: The models consist of
two countries, each represented by a unit mass of households with identical preference. In
addition, there exists a unit mass of homogeneous multinational entrepreneurs who seek
prot opportunities both in home and foreign country. MNEs locate their production units
both in home and foreign country and they produce the same single good everywhere.
The nationality of MNEs is irrelevant in my models because I assume no barrier in entering
good markets and no trade costs. I assume only MNEs have production technology. In each
62In my model, the good produced in home country is a perfect substitute of the good produced in foreign
country.
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country, there is real estate which is in xed supply, locally traded and held either MNEs or
local households. MNEs can enter into local markets to acquire real estate. The real estate
held by MNEs is used as an input of production. Real estate held by households cannot be
used as an input of production but it yields housing service to households. Finally, agents
trade uncontingent bonds which can be traded internationally. Hence the economy has two
types of assets, real estate and bonds.
3.2.1 The frictionless model
I start from the frictionless model in which MNEs do not face borrowing limits.63
MNEs derive utility from consumption, denoted by ce:
max
1X
t=0
t ln cet :
 is the subjective discount rate of MNEs. The superscript e denotes variables of the
MNEs. They also produce the single good ye by locating production units in both countries.
They hire labor l from households and input their real estate holdings he in each country.
The production technology is represented by a constant-return-to-scale Cobb-Douglas for-
mulation:
yet = yt + y
0
t;
yt = At(h
e
t 1)
(lt)
1 :
y0t = A
0
t(h
0e
t 1)
(l0t)
1 :
 is the real estate share in the Cobb-Douglas technology. The superscript 0 denotes
variables in foreign country. Thus, y denotes output in home country and y0 denotes output
in foreign country. I assume that MNEs take the level of technology A and A0 as given.
63By a transversality condition, MNEs are prohibited to roll over debt innitely and to play Ponzi-scheme.
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Because the goods produced in home country and foreign country are homogeneous, the
allocation of resources in equilibrium is such that the prices of the good are the same
between home and foreign country.
I assume that the existence ofMNEs is given. This may be a strict assumption. Markusen
(1998) and Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) examine conditions that rms implement
foreign direct investment (FDI) rather than exporting.64 Cavallari (2007), using dynamic
models, studies how difference in rms' integration strategies affects international business
cycle transmissions.65 I do not consider the integration strategies of rms because my fo-
cus is on how MNEs transmit shocks from country to country rather than why they choose
to be MNEs. It would be a richer study to incorporate endogeneity of rms' integration
strategies, but I leave it a future course of studies.
It is worth noting the properties of real estate. Real estate serves as an input of produc-
tion as well as a means of savings to MNEs. It is not traded internationally and its price
relative to the consumption good is denoted by q. The total supply of real estate is xed
to h in each country. MNEs enter into local markets and purchase real estate. A technical
assumption is that MNEs cannot rent real estate from households. Only MNEs' real estate
holdings matter for production. Given this, the ow of funds of MNEs is:
cet + qth
e
t + q
0
th
0e
t + rt 1b
e
t 1 + r
0
t 1b
0e
t 1 +

2
(bet)
2 + 
2
(b0et )
2 =
yet   wtlt   w0tl0t + qthet 1 + q0th0et 1 + bet + b0et +  et +  0et :
The LHS is the expenditures of MNEs. They consume, purchase real estate and repay debts,
b and b0, with gross interest rates r and r0. The RHS is the resources of MNEs. Their income
is output net of labor compensation. The wage rate isw. They have initial real estate wealth
and they can borrow from households. A technical point is that the quadratic adjustment
costs on debts.  controls the degree of the adjustment costs. The adjustment costs ensure
64These studies introduce plant specic xed cost and variable transportation cost. They show that rms
choose FDI when the transportation cost incurred by exports overweigh the xed cost of FDI.
65She does not report detailed statistics on business cycle properties generated by the model. Also, she
assumes that domestic rms only serve their goods in foreign market.
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us that the model has a unique non-stochastic steady state. MNEs pay the adjustment costs
to a nancial intermediary when they borrow but the nancial intermediary pays them back
to MNEs in a lump-sum manner, denoted by  e.66
Under this setting, I obtain the optimality conditions on real estate holdings as fol-
lows67:
qt
cet
= Et

1
cet+1


yt+1
het

+ Et

qt+1
cet+1

; (3.1)
q0t
cet
= Et

1
cet+1


y0t+1
h0et

+ Et

q0t+1
cet+1

:
MNEs equate the marginal utility of selling real estate and the marginal benet of holding
real estate. The latter consists of the expected marginal product of real estate and the
expected selling price tomorrow in unit of the marginal utility of consumption tomorrow.
The system of equations (3.1) indicates that MNEs' decisions on real estate holdings
in each country are tied with their consumption. One source that the prices of local assets
are not independent of foreign shocks is the portfolio decisions by MNEs. For example,
an increase of MNEs' consumption today motivates them to increase real estate demand in
both countries if future is constant.
The problem of domestic households is standard except that owning real estate yields
utility to them:
max
1X
t=0
t

ln ct +  lnht   (lt)



:
 is the subjective discount rate of households,  is the weight attached to the service ow
of housing and    1 is the inverse of the elasticity of labor supply.
Their budget constraint is:
ct + qtht + rt 1bt 1 + rt 1b

t 1 +

2
(bt)
2 + 
2
(bt )
2 =
wtlt + qtht 1 + bt + bt +  t + 

t :
66Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003) discuss this issue in detail .
67The full list of the equations can be seen in Appendix C.
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b denotes borrowings fromMNEs and r denotes their interest rate. Correspondingly, b and
r are those with foreign households. There is a room for home and foreign households
to share their income risks. Again I introduce the quadratic adjustment costs on bond
holdings, b and b, to obtain the unique steady state. The problem of foreign households is
symmetric to domestic households.
Together with the standard Euler equation and the labor supply equation, I obtain house-
holds' optimality condition on real estate holdings as follows:
qt
ct
=
 
ht
+ Et

qt+1
ct+1

: (3.2)
They equate the marginal utility of selling real estate and the marginal benet of holding
real estate. The logic is the same as (3.1). The latter consists of the marginal utility of
housing service today and the expected marginal utility of selling real estate tomorrow.
Finally, I impose  =  for the frictionless model to avoid over accumulation of nan-
cial assets by the households.
3.2.2 The model with borrowing constraints
For the alternative model, I assume MNEs face following limited enforceability prob-
lems on nancial contracts: production technology is rm specic in that no one can take
over the production processes once MNEs obtain borrowings. And lenders, households in
my model, cannot make MNEs precommit to engage in production. Under this assumption,
MNEs can take a renegotiation strategy to reduce debt repayments. Assuming that MNEs
have full bargaining power, household's capacity to recover loan losses is limited up to the
value of collateral they took fromMNEs. Under this assumption households could squeeze
nothing if there lending had no collateral. Thus only collateralized borrowings are available
to MNEs. This logic is the same as that in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997).
The collateral is real estate in my model. MNEs can borrow from households in both
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countries. But domestic households accept real estate in home country only as collateral
and vice versa. As a result, there are two new constraints to the MNEs' problem:
rtb
e
t  mEt(qt+1het ); (3.3)
r0tb
0e
t  mEt(q0t+1h0et ):
Here,m is the loan-to-value ratio.68
Because these constraints pin down the unique steady state of this economy, I dropped
the adjustment costs associated with MNEs' debt holdings. The ow of funds of MNEs is
thus modied as:
cet + qth
e
t + q
0
th
0e
t + rt 1b
e
t 1 + r
0
t 1b
0e
t 1 =
yet   wtlt   w0tl0t + qthet 1 + q0th0et 1 + bet + b0et :
Finally, to make MNEs always debtors, I impose  >  for this model: As MNEs
are impatient relative to households, they always have incentives to borrow the maximum
amount in the neighborhood of the steady state.69
The rst-order conditions for real estate holdings are modied as follows:
qt
cet
= Et

1
cet+1


yt+1
het

+ Et

qt+1
cet+1

+mtEt(qt+1); (3.4)
q0t
cet
= Et

1
cet+1


y0t+1
h0et

+ Et

q0t+1
cet+1

+m0tEt(q
0
t+1):
t and 0t are Lagrange multipliers associated with the borrowing constraints (3.3). In the
RHS, I have additional terms mtEt(qt+1) and m0tEt(q0t+1) that represent the marginal
benets of relaxing the borrowing constraints. A relaxation of the borrowing constraints
68The fraction (1 m) can be interpreted as the cost to liquidate MNEs' assets.
69Because MNEs are risk averse, MNEs may have incentives to save rather than borrow if today's income
is higher than future income. I restrict my attention in the neighborhood of the steady state with a small
degree of shocks so that the borrowing constraints always bind. A simulation by Iacoviello (2005) shows that
if the variances of shocks are small, the borrowing constraints always bind in the neighborhood of the steady
state.
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enables MNEs to increase investment in real estate. The increased real estate holdings and
the associated house price appreciation relax the borrowing constraints further. An innite
sequence of this logical circulation generates a strong multiplier effect even if the initial
increase of collateral value is marginal.70
We can think that t and 0t capture the marginal benet of the net worth of MNEs.71
As Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Hormström and Tirole (1998) proved, an increase of
net worth reduces agency costs under asymmetric information problems. Not only a pure
increase of resource but also the reduction of the agency costs create more than one-to-
one increase in investment. I will show that this effect creates completely different output
dynamics compared to the frictionless model.
3.2.3 Productivity shocks
The exogenous shocks in my models are country specic productivity shocks. I assume
log of productivity follows a VAR(1) process. The two shocks may be correlated.
264 logAt
logA0t
375 =
264 11 12
21 22
375
264 logAt 1
logA0t 1
375+
264 t
0t
375 ;
var
264 t
0t
375 =
264 21 12
12 
2
2
375 :
11 and 22 measure the persistencies of the productivity process of each country. 12 and
21 measure the spillover effects. 12 6= 0 implies that the two shocks are correlated.
70Although the borrowing constraints bind, MNEs increase both consumption and investment in response
to the marginal increase of their net worth under my specication. The consumption-investment allocation
depends on the degree of risk aversion. The smaller the degree of risk aversion, the larger share of incremental
resources is allocated to consumption. This weakens the multiplier effect which emerges from the relaxation
of the borrowing constraints because MNEs' real estate accumulation is slowed.
71The net worth at the beginning of period t is dened as yet  wtlt w0tl0t+ qthet 1+ q0th0et 1  rt 1bet 1 
rr 1b0et 1:
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3.2.4 Equilibrium condition
In equilibrium, real estate demand must be equalized to real estate supply:
ht + h
e
t =
h; h0t + h
0e
t =
h0:
Bond markets' clearing conditions are:
bt + b
e
t = 0; b
0
t + b
0e
t = 0; b

t + b
0
t = 0:
In the model with the borrowing constraints, the constraints bind in both countries:
rtb
e
t = mEt(qt+1h
e
t); r
0
tb
0e
t = mEt(q
0
t+1h
0e
t ):
The good market clearing is:
yt + y
0
t = ct + c
0
t + c
e
t :
3.3 The Results
3.3.1 The methods
I calibrate the deep parameters of the models, linearize the models in the neighborhood
of their non-stochastic steady states and inspect impulse responses to a productivity shock
in home country. I also simulate the models by specifying exogenous shock processes
and I report cross-country correlations of various endogenous variables generated by the
simulation.72 And I compare them with actual data as well as data simulated by standard
international business cycle literature.
72I utilize "Toolkit" which is developed by Uhlig (1997) when I solve the models numerically.
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Description Symbol Parameter Values
Frictionless model Financial friction
Discount rate, households  0:99 0:99
Discount rate, entrepreneurs  0:99 0:98
Labor-wage elasticity 1
 1 0:05 0:05
Weight on housing service  0:1 0:1
Real estate share  0:1 0:1
Loan-to-value ratio m 0:9 0:9
Adjustment cost of bond  0:00001 0:00001
Real estate supply h, h0 1 1
Table 3-1: The parameter values of the economy
3.3.2 Calibration
Table 3-1 represents the values of the deep parameters. The parameter values are based
on Iacoviello and Minetti (2006) and Kollman (1996). Time frequency is quarterly.  =
0:99 implies the annual interest rate is 4% in the steady states. I set  = 0:98 for the model
with the borrowing constraints so that the borrowing constraints bind in the neighborhood
of the steady state. The loan-to-value ratio m is set to 0.9, which is in line with actual
lending practices. The settings of  and  imply that MNEs own roughly 50% of real
estate in each country. The coefcient on the adjustment costs of bond holdings is set to
be tiny. I introduce the adjustment costs only to pin down the unique steady state in each
version of the models. Therefore I set  so that the adjustment costs themselves do not
generate a powerful force to the dynamics of the models. I normalize real estate supply to
one in each country.73
Table 3-2 represents two specications on the evolution of productivity. The rst col-
umn represents the standard setting: the productivity is highly persistent but the shocks
have no international spillover effects. Shocks in home and foreign country (t and 0t) are
correlated and the correlation is set to be 0:2. These values are taken from Kollman (1996).
73The results in this paper are not sensitive to the level of real estate supply.
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Description Symbol Parameter Values
Standard Spillover
Persistency of shocks ii 0:95 0:95
Spillover effect ij 0 0:02
Variance of shocks 2i 0:0073 0:0073
Covariance of shocks ij 0:0015 0:0015
Table 3-2: Parameters on the productivity process
The second column incorporates the spillover effect. Since the spillover effect is one of
the main issues regarding with FDI, it would be a recommended experiment to allow the
spillover effect.74
One may think that the spillover coefcient is small. However, the VAR(1) process of
productivity implies that foreign country productivity rises by 0.15% at peak when a home
country shock raises home productivity by 1%.
3.3.3 Impulse responses
Frictionless economy
Figure 3-1 shows the impulse responses to a temporary productivity shock in home
country. In this setup, I assume there is no persistency in the productivity process (i.e
ii = 0). Output increases in home country but falls in foreign country. Similarly, labor
hours move in opposite directions between the two countries. These responses emerge be-
cause of the resource reallocation conducted byMNEs. However, consumption rises in both
countries. Though foreign households do not experience a favorable shock, they borrow
from other agents in the economy and consume more through an international risk shar-
ing channel.75 Notice that the agents adjusts everything instantaneously in the frictionless
74Estimations based on macroeconomic data, such as Kollman (1996) suggest that the international
spillover effects are almost zero. However, recent microeconometric studies, such as Keller and Yeaple
(2005), nd that there are signicant spillover effects from FDI.
75Kehoe and Perri (2002) illustrate that the uctuations of a economy in a single bond world quite resemble
to those of a complete market economy, where agents can trade state contingent claims for every possible
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Figure 3-1: Impulse responses to a 1% temporary productivity shock in home country. (The
frictionless economy)
economy.
The responses of real estate related variables are somewhat difcult to interpret. The
real estate prices rise in both countries but the real estate allocation does not change vir-
tually. Particularly, the real estate price in foreign country rises even though it doesn't
experience a positive shock.
To understand the dynamics of real estate markets, it is informative to see the FOCs
on real estate holdings. The following equations are the restatement of FOCs on foreign
states in the future.
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Figure 3-2: The price and the allocation of real estate in equilibrium (foreign country)
country real estate holdings in (3.1) and (3.2):
q0t
cet
= Et

1
cet+1


y0t+1
h0et

+ Et

q0t+1
cet+1

;
q0t
c0t
=
 
h0t
+ Et

q0t+1
c0t+1

:
These equations tell that the foreign real estate price, q0t, and the foreign real estate
holdings of each agent, h0t and h0et , have a negative relationship holding future variables
constant: The demand curves of real estate have standard downward slopes.
Figure 3-2 illustrates what happens in the foreign real estate market. The equilibrium
price rises because both agents increase real estate demands. MNEs save a portion of
incremental income due to consumption smoothing. Because the temporary shock does
not change the protability of investment in the future, MNEs have incentives to invest not
only in home country but also in foreign country. For foreign households, income transfers
through the international risk sharing channel induces them to increase real estate demand.
With the parameter values of Table 3-1, the equilibrium allocation of real estate does
not change virtually because the increase of real estate demand of one agent just offsets
that of the other. The offsetting force comes from the fact that real estate supply is xed
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Figure 3-3: Impulse responses to a 1% persistent home productivity shock (11 = 0:95,
The frictionless model)
and the economy has no way to increase aggregate savings.
The real estate price co-movement arises because the phenomenon illustrated in Figure
3-2 occurs in both countries. From the perspective of MNEs' optimization, MNEs increase
real estate demand in both countries. Recall the system of equations (3.1). An increase of
consumption induces MNEs to valuate saving more. Since future productivity is the same
across countries, MNEs increase real estate demand at the same rate in both countries.
The invariance of real estate allocation is not a general result. A change in parameters,
preferences and other things create different dynamics in real estate allocation.76
76For instance, when the degree of risk aversion differs between MNEs and households, the dynamics
of real estate allocation change. I conrm that MNEs sells real estate and increase consumption further in
response to the productivity shock if MNEs are more risk loving than households.
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Figure 3-3 shows responses to a positive home productivity shock when the productivity
process is persistent (i.e ii = 0:95). In this scenario, MNEs purchase real estate in home
country but sell in foreign country. MNEs, knowing future productivity will rise in home
country, have strong incentives to shift production resources to home country. This desire
is strong enough that the actual real estate holdings increase in home country even the price
rises in the equilibrium. Notice the divergence of real estate holdings directly leads to the
divergence of output.
Asset price co-movement is preserved in this scenario. Although the real estate de-
mand of MNEs in foreign country is dampened by the substitution effect, this restores the
marginal product of real estate (Intuitively, this is a movement along the demand curve of
MNEs in Figure 3-2). And the international risk sharing channel increases the real estate
demand of foreign households (This is an upward shift of the demand curve of foreign
households). These forces push up the price of foreign real estate. However, this general
equilibrium effect is at odds with phenomena in the real world. For example, the interna-
tional risk sharing implies that MNEs lend to foreign households. Intuitively, this rarely
happens in the real world. The asset price co-movement is a sort of by-product in this
frictionless model.
The economy with the borrowing constraints - the wealth effect
An important feature of the model with the borrowing constraints is that marginal in-
creases of the net worth of constrained agents have powerful multiplier effects on invest-
ment. Kiyotaki andMoore (1997) show that, in a closed economy, positive shocks to the net
worth increase real estate holdings of credit-constrained rms and they show that aggregate
output increases by more than the magnitude of initial shocks. Dietrich (2004) studies an
static small open economy model with nancially constrained MNEs. In his model, MNEs
have two types of investment opportunities: Domestic investment and FDI. He shows that
an increase of MNEs' net worth induces them to increase FDI as well as domestic invest-
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ment. Under the nancial constraint, which is similar to the one developed in this chapter,
underinvestment occurs both in domestic investment and FDI. This implies MNEs would
have incentives to increase investment in both countries if they obtained an incremental
resource. The extent to which MNEs increase each type of investment is determined by its
protability. That is, MNEs increase investment in both countries so that marginal returns
of domestic investment and FDI become the same.
The basic idea of Dietrich (2004) is carried over to my model as the borrowing con-
straints in my model cause underinvestment in both countries.77 The marginal increase of
the net worth of MNEs would push up investment in both countries. To conrm this intu-
ition, I conduct a following experiment. After all agents have completed their optimization
at time t   1, I reallocate real estate in home country from home households to MNEs so
that the real estate holdings of MNEs increase by 1% initially. And I investigate how this
reallocation affects the optimization of MNEs and the uctuation of the economy from time
t onward. This experiment looks into how the economy responds to a marginal increase of
the net worth of MNEs.
Figure 3-4 shows the impulse responses. The impulse responses tell three things: i)
MNEs increase real estate holdings in both countries. ii) The magnitude of the increase of
real estate holdings is more than the magnitude of the initial shock. iii) Output increases in
both countries.
The rst observation conrms my intuition above. Because underinvestment occurs in
both countries, an increase of the net worth induces MNEs to invest in both countries. And
the magnitude of the increase is almost the same across countries.78 A desire to equate
the marginal benet of real estate holdings leads MNEs to invest in both countries almost
equally.
77The proof is in Appendix C.
78The general equilibrium effect causes tiny differences in the magnitude of the response of real estate
investment. Especially, home households face a negative shock but foreign households don't. This creates a
difference in consumption between the two types of households which in turn creates a slight difference in
the equilibrium allocation of real estate in the two countries.
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Figure 3-4: Impulse responses to a 1% land reallocation shock in home country. (The
model with the borrowing constraints)
The large responses of real estate holdings come from the multiplier effect of relaxing
the borrowing constraints. Investment in real estate increases assets of MNEs. MNEs
can utilize the incremental assets as collateral for borrowing. This in turn increases the
resources for investment further. This sequence creates more than one-to-one effect on
MNEs' real estate holdings. This force is captured by mtqt+1 in equation (3.4). I call it
the wealth effect of MNEs' net worth.
In my model, the above force works in both countries. MNEs can obtain the strong
multiplier effect not only investing in home country but also investing in foreign country
despite the fact that the initial shock hits home country. In all, MNEs take advantage of
the multiplier effects in both countries and invest until the marginal benets of real estate
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holdings become the same across the two countries.
With this mechanism in our mind, let us see the impulse responses when a positive pro-
ductivity shock hits home country. Here I assume that the productivity process is persistent
(i.e ii = 0:95). Figure 3-5 shows the impulse responses. MNEs purchase real estate in
both countries in the equilibrium. There are two forces exerting in this economy. Because
the shock is in favor of home country production, there would be a desire to reallocate
resources from foreign country to home country. Namely, this is the substitution effect.79
However, the positive productivity shock increases the net worth of MNEs. Thus the wealth
effect, which induces MNEs to increase investment in both countries, arises. Under the pa-
rameter values in Table 3-1, the wealth effect well dominates and MNEs increase real estate
holdings in both countries. As a consequence, output rises in both countries.
Asset price co-movement appears again in this experiment. However, the mechanism
is different from that of the frictionless model. MNEs increases real estate demand in both
countries as opposed to the case of the frictionless model (See Figure 3-2). The relaxation
of the borrowing constraints shifts up the demand curve of MNEs in both countries. This
puts pressure on real estate prices. Foreign households increase real estate demand too, but
the main force is increase of labor income rather than the international risk sharing chan-
nel.80 The increase of output in both countries increases the labor income of households
in both countries. Notice MNEs borrow more from foreign households in the equilibrium.
This is a sharp contrast to the impulse response of the frictionless model. The portfolio
decisions of MNEs under the presence of the wealth effect are the main driver of the asset
price co-movement in the model with the borrowing constraints.
79In the labor market, hours worked increase in home country while they decrease in foreign country. This
captures the substitution effect exerting in this model.
80There is still a channel of international risk sharing because I allow bond trading between home and
foreign households. However, the asset price co-movement arises even if I shut down the international risk
sharing channel.
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Figure 3-5: Impulse responses to a 1% persistent productivity shock in home country.
(11 = 0:95. The model with the borrowing constraints)
3.3.4 Simulation
Before simulating the model, I modied my models to include variable capital. I as-
sume that the variable capital enters into production function and it is owned by MNEs.
Hence, the production function is modied as:
ket = kt + k
0
t;
yet = yt + y
0
t = At(h
e
t 1)
(kt 1)(lt)1   + A0t(h
0e
t 1)
(k0t 1)
(l0t)
1   :
 is the capital share. I set  = 0:23. I x  as in Table 3-1. This implies the labor share
1      v = 0:67. Capital can be freely relocated between home and foreign country
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and it depreciates at the rate  = 0:025: The budget constraint of MNEs now includes the
evolution of capital.81 Households' budget constraints do not change.
As for the model with the borrowing constraints, the variable capital also serves as
collateral for borrowing. I assume that domestic households take only capital in home
country as collateral and vice versa. The borrowing constraints of MNEs are thus modied
as:
rtb
e
t  m [Et(qt+1het) + kt] ;
r0tb
0e
t  m

Et(q
0
t+1h
0e
t ) + k
0
t

:
These modications create a channel for the economy to increase aggregate savings.
And they make my models more comparable to international business cycle models as
many of them have variable capital.
In addition, I exclude bond transactions between home and foreign households in the
model with the borrowing constraints. In the real world, opportunities for international risk
sharing among working households may be restricted considerably. In my models, this can
be achieved by excluding opportunities for bond trading between two types of households.
I focus on the cross-country correlations of various endogenous variables. Table 3-
3 shows the simulation results. Column 1 represents the result when MNEs do not face
the borrowing constraints. Column 2 shows the result with the borrowing constraints but
without the spillover effect of productivity shocks. Column 3 shows the result when we also
have the spillover effect. I compare my results with a standard international RBC model
(Column 4, based on Backus Kehoe and Kydland (1992)) and data of developed countries
(Column 5, based on Kehoe and Perri (2002) and Iacoviello and Minetti (2006)).
The frictionless economy (Column 1) predicts negative cross-country correlations in
output, capital investment and employment. It also predicts unreasonably high cross-
81See Appendix C for the exact form of the budget constraint.
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Description No friction Financial friction BKK data
No spillover With spillover
International correlation
Output y; y0  0:19 0:19 0:21  0:18 0:51
Consumption c; c0 0:94 0:27 0:47 0:88 0:32
Employment l; l0  0:96 0:20 0:12 n:a 0:43
Capital investment i; i0  0:82  0:24  0:08 n:a 0:29
Real estate prices q; q0 0:94 0:37 0:56 n:a 0:50
Notes: BKK represents baseline result of Backus Kehoe and Kydland (1992) in which they assume
no friction in the model. For, column 4, the rst four values are correlations between U.S. variables and
15 EU-country variables which are based on Kehoe and Perri (2002). The correlation of real estate prices
represents that between U.S. and Japan based on Iacoviello and Minetti (2006). All series are HP ltered
with smoothing parameter =1600.
Table 3-3: Business cycle properties
country correlation in consumption. Basically, these are what standard international RBC
models predict. Without any frictions in nancial markets, whether the rms are MNEs or
exporting rms is irrelevant for the cross-country correlations.
The models with the borrowing constraints (Column 2 & 3) yield positive cross-country
output correlations. The dominance of the wealth effect generates positive co-movement
in output. The lower cross-country correlations in consumption and real estate prices are
derived from the exclusion of the international risk sharing channel. These are the wedges
between my models (Column 2 & 3) and standard international RBC models. Eliminating
opportunities for risk sharing reduces the cross-country consumption correlation dramati-
cally. Allowing the spillover effect widens the gap between consumption and output. This
is also observed in Kehoe and Perri (2002) and Heathcore and Perri (2002).
Cross-country correlations in factor inputs become closer to the actual data though
there are still discrepancies. As for the labor market, labor hours in each country turn
to be positively correlated. From the perspective of foreign households, the removal of
bond trading with home households contains the increase of consumption when a positive
productivity shock hits home country. This in turn contains the leftward shift of the labor
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supply curve.82 On the other hand, an increase of the marginal product of labor in foreign
country induces MNEs to increase labor demand given real wage.83 These forces result in
more employment in foreign country and create positive co-movement of labor hours.
Although discrepancies between simulated data and actual data still remain, the model
with the borrowing constraints ts better to actual data. Financially constrained MNEs are
a persuasive factor of explaining the uctuation of actual economies.
3.4 Conclusion
This chapter examines the transmission mechanisms of international business cycles
when there are internationally operated entrepreneurs. The focus of this chapter is how
business cycles are transmitted from one country to another when the borrowing capac-
ity of MNEs is limited. I nd that cross-country output correlation depends on MNEs'
ability to raise funds in nancial markets. Without restriction in the borrowing capacity,
the substitution effect dominates in response to productivity shocks and output tends to
be negatively correlated. When MNEs' borrowing capacity is limited, the wealth effect
dominates and cross-country output correlation becomes positive. The local asset prices
co-move positively in response to country specic productivity shocks. This is robust to
various specications of the models but underlying mechanisms differ in the specications
of borrowing capacity. For the frictionless model, the high degree of international risk shar-
ing is the driver of co-movement but it is at odds with the phenomenon in the real world
because rms lend to households. On the other hand, if MNEs are constrained in bor-
rowing capacity, the wealth effect and their portfolio decisions have rst order impacts on
the asset price co-movement. As recent international business cycle literature reveals, my
ndings suggest that limited enforceability on nancial contracts is a key factor to explain
82The labor supply equation is l 1t = wt=ct: An increase of household's consumption shifts the labor
supply curve leftward in a partial equilibrium context.
83In a partial equilibrium context, the marginal product of labor rises when MNEs increase real estate
holdings because of the Cobb-Douglas technology.
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international business cycle properties.
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C Appendix C
In this appendix, I describe the details of the models in chapter 3. I present the op-
timality condition of the agents. Then I describe the steady states and the equations that
characterize the dynamics around the steady states.
The Frictionless Economy Model
FOCs and Market Clearing Conditions
By solving home households' problem, I obtain:
(lt)
 1 =
wt
ct
;
1
ct
(1  bt) = rtEt

1
ct+1

;
1
ct
(1  bt ) = rtEt

1
ct+1

;
qt
ct
=
 
ht
+ Et

qt+1
ct+1

:
These are labor supply equation, Euler equations on debt choices and the optimality condi-
tion regarding real estate holdings respectively. Foreign households' optimality conditions
are symmetric to those of home households:
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By solving MNEs' problem, I obtain:
wt = (1  )
yt
lt
;
w0t = (1  )
y0t
l0t
;
1
cet
(1  bet ) = rtEt

1
cet+1

;
1
cet
(1  b0et ) = r0tEt

1
cet+1

;
qt
cet
= Et

1
cet+1


yt+1
het

+ Et

qt+1
cet+1

;
q0t
cet
= Et

1
cet+1


y0t+1
h0et

+ Et

q0t+1
cet+1

:
These are, in order, labor demand equations in each country, Euler equations on debt
choices and the optimality conditions regarding real estate holdings of MNEs.
The unknowns are fc; c0; ce; y; y0; ye; h; h0; he; h0e; l; l0; b; b0; be; b0e; b; q; q0; w; w0; r;
r0; rg.84
Home households' optimality conditions, corresponding foreign households' optimal-
ity conditions, MNEs' optimality conditions, the market clearing conditions, two house-
holds' budget constraints and three production equations (presented in section 3.2.1) form
24 equations for 24 unknowns.85
84The total factor productivities, A and A0, are also unknown parameters. These are determined by a
exogenous process.
85One of the budget constraints of the three agents is redundant.
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The Steady State
The steady state can be summarized as follows:
r = r0 = r =  1;
b = b0 = be = b0e = b = 0;
q
c
=
(1  )h
 
;
q0
c0
=
(1  )h0
 
;
qhe
y
=
q0h0e
y0
=

1   ;
c
y
=
c0
y0
= (1  );
c
y
= (1  )l ; c
0
y0
= (1  )l0 ;
he
h
=
h0e
h0
=

 (1  ) ;
y0
y
=
h0
h

;
ce
y
= 

1 +
h0
h

;
A = A0 = 1:
The steady state level of debts are zero because I assume that there are quadratic adjust-
ment costs on debt holdings around b = 0. The total value of real estate is the real estate
share, , times the discounted sum of the value of output (The forth row). household's
consumption-output ratio is obtained by evaluating the households' budget constraints at
the steady state. the relative output is proportional to the relative real estate supply (the
eighth row). By the good market clearing condition the ratio of MNEs' consumption to
home output is given by the ninth row. Steady state productivity level is normalized to one.
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Log Linearization
Followings are the system of log-linearized equations.
bct = byt   blt;
bc0t = by0t   bl0t;
bct = Etdct+1   brt + dbet ;
bct = Etdct+1   brt   dbt ;
bc0t = Etdc0t+1   br0t + db0et ;
bc0t = Etdc0t+1   brt + dbt ;
bqt   bct = (1  )he
h
bhet + Et (dqt+1  dct+1) ;
bq0t   bc0t = (1  )h0eh0 ch0et + Et dq0t+1  dc0t+1 ;bcet = Etdcet+1   brt   dbet :
bcet = Etdcet+1   br0t   db0et :
bqt   bcet = (1  ) hEt(dyt+1)  bheti+ Et(dqt+1)  Et(dcet+1);
bq0t   bcet = (1  ) hEt(dy0t+1) ch0et i+ Et(dq0t+1)  Et(dcet+1);
c
y
bct   qhe
y
bhet   1ydbet 1 + 1ydbt 1 = (1  )byt   qhey dhet 1   1ydbet + 1ydbt ;
c0
y0
bc0t   q0h0ey0 ch0et   1y0db0et 1   1y0dbt 1 = (1  )by0t   q0h0ey0 dh0et 1   1y0db0et   1y0dbt ;
byt + y0
y
by0t = cy bct + c0y0  y0y bc0t + cey bcet ;byt =cAt + dhet 1 + (1  )blt;
by0t =cA0t + dh0et 1 + (1  )bl0t:
A technical complication is how to log-linearize equations containing the debts be; b0e;
and b because these variables are zero in the steady state. I proceed with the following
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ways: For all variables except debts, I dene x^ as log deviation from the steady state. For
bonds, I dene db as deviations in level from the steady state.
Together with the evolution of productivity in section 3.2.3, the equations above form
19 equations for 19 unknowns, fbc; bc0; bce; by; by0; bye;bhe; bh0e; bl; bl0; dbe; db0e; db; bq; bq0; br; br0;
brg:
The model with the borrowing constraints
The Model
Multinational Entrepreneurs (MNEs)
The amount that MNEs can borrow from households is now limited up to a fraction of
the expected value of collateral. The collateral is real estate in this model. Home house-
holds only accept real estate in home country as collateral and vice versa.
max
1X
t=0
t ln cet ;
s:t:
cet + qth
e
t + q
0
th
0e
t + rt 1b
e
t 1 + r
0
t 1b
0e
t 1 =
yet   wtlt   w0tl0t + qthet 1 + q0th0et 1 + bet + b0et ;
rtb
e
t  mEt(qt+1het );
r0tb
0e
t  mEt(q0t+1h0et );
yet = yt + y
0
t;
yt = At(h
e
t 1)
(lt)
1 ; y0t = A
0
t(h
0e
t 1)
(l0t)
1 :
I assume  >  in this model so that the borrowing constraints bind in the neighborhood
of the steady state. Since the borrowing constraints pin down the unique steady state of the
debts, be and b0e, I drop the quadratic adjustment costs regarding with these debts.
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Households
Because households no longer pay for the adjustment costs on debts b and b0, their
budget constraints are modied as follows:
ct + qtht + rt 1bt 1 + rt 1b

t 1 +

2
(bt )
2
= wtlt + qtht 1 + bt + bt + 

t :
Notice the adjustment cost on b, which represents the nancial transaction between
home and foreign households, remains because nothing other than the adjustment cost pins
down the unique steady state of b.
FOCs and Market Clearing Conditions
MNEs optimality conditions are given as follows:
wt = (1  )yt
lt
;
w0t = (1  )
y0t
l0t
;
1
cet
= rtEt

1
cet+1

+ rt
e
t ;
1
cet
= r0tEt

1
cet+1

+ rt
0e
t ;
qt
cet
= Et

1
cet+1


yt+1
het

+ Et

qt+1
cet+1

+metEt(qt+1);
q0t
cet
= Et

1
cet+1


y0t+1
h0et

+ Et

q0t+1
cet+1

+m0et Et(q
0
t+1):
e and 0e represent Lagrange multipliers associated with the borrowing constraints. Euler
equations on debt choices and real estate holdings now include the marginal benet of
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relaxing the borrowing constraints. By eliminating the Lagrange multipliers, we get:
qt
cet
= Et

1
cet+1


yt+1
het

+ Et

qt+1

m
rtcet
+
(1 m)
cet+1

;
q0t
cet
= Et

1
cet+1


y0t+1
h0et

+ Et

q0t+1

m
r0tcet
+
(1 m)
c0et+1

:
For home households' optimality conditions, there is a slight change in the optimality
condition on debt transaction with MNEs (the second row):
(lt)
 1 =
wt
ct
;
1
ct
= rtEt

1
ct+1

;
1
ct
(1  bt ) = rtEt

1
ct+1

;
qt
ct
=
 
ht
+ Et

qt+1
ct+1

:
Foreign households' optimality conditions are also modied accordingly.
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The Steady State
The steady state is summarized as follows:
r = r0 = r =  1;
b = 0;
q
c
=
(1  )h
 
;
q0
c0
=
(1  )h0
 
;
qhe
y
=
q0h0e
y0
=

1   where  = m + (1 m);
qhe
b
=
q0h0e
b0
=
1
m
;
b
y
=
b0
y0
=
m
1   ;
c
y
=
c0
y0
= (1  ) + m(
 1   1)
1   ;
he
h
=
h0e
h0
=
(1  )
 (1  ) 
y
c
;
l = l0 =
h
(1  )y
c
i 1

;
y0
y
=
h0
h

;
ce
y
=

1  c
y

1 +
y0
y

;
A = A0 = 1:
In this model, the debts of MNEs are positive (the forth and the fth row). They are
obtained by evaluating the borrowing constraints at the steady state.
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Log Linearization
The system of log linearized equations is as follows:
bct = byt   blt;
bc0t = by0t   bl0t;
bct = Etdct+1   brt;
bc0t = Etdc0t+1   br0t;
brt = brt + dbt ;
br0t = brt   dbt ;
bqt   bct = (1  )he
h
bhet + Et (dqt+1  dct+1) ;
bq0t   bc0t = (1  )h0eh0 ch0et + Et dq0t+1  dc0t+1 ;
bqt   (1 m)bcet
= (1  )
h
Et(dyt+1)  bheti+ Et(dqt+1)  (1 m)Et(dcet+1) mrt;
bq0t   (1 m)bcet
= (1  )
h
Et(dy0t+1) ch0et i+ Et(dq0t+1)  (1 m)Et(dcet+1) mr0t;
c
y
bct   qhe
y
bhet   by (dbet 1 +drt 1) + 1ydbt 1 = (1  )byt   qhey dhet 1   by bbet + 1ydbt ;
c0
y0
bc0t   q0h0ey0 ch0et   by (db0et 1 +dr0t 1)  1y0dbt 1
= (1  )by0t   q0h0ey0 dh0et 1   by bb0et   1y0dbt ;
byt + y0
y
by0t = cy bct + c0y0  y0y bc0t + cey bcet ;bbet + brt = Et(dqt+1) + bhet ;
bb0et + br0t = Et(dq0t+1) +ch0et ;
byt =cAt + dhet 1 + (1  )blt;
by0t =cA0t + dh0et 1 + (1  )bl0t:
119
Together with the productivity specication this system forms 19 equations for 19 un-
knowns, fbc; bc0; bce; by; by0; bye;bhe; bh0e; bl; bl0; bbe; bb0e; db; bq; bq0; br; br0; brg:
The Model with Variable Capital
In the models with variable capital, production functions and the law of the motion of
capital are:
ket = kt + k
0
t;
yt = At(h
e
t 1)
(kt 1)(lt)1   ;
y0t = At(h
0e
t 1)
(k0t 1)
(l0t)
1   ;
it = kt   (1  )kt 1;
i0t = k
0
t   (1  )k0t 1:
i and i0 are capital investment of MNEs in each country.  is the depreciation rate of
capital and v is the capital share in production function.
When MNEs do not face the borrowing constraints, the ow of funds of MNEs is
modied as:
cet + it + i
0
t + qth
e
t + q
0
th
0e
t + rt 1b
e
t 1 + r
0
t 1b
0e
t 1 +

2
(bet )
2 + 
2
(b0et )
2 =
yet   wtlt   w0tl0t + qthet 1 + q0th0et 1 + bet + b0et +  et +  0et ;
When MNEs face the borrowing constraints, I assume that capital can be used as col-
lateral for borrowing:
rtb
e
t  m

Et(qt+1h
e
t ) + kt

;
r0tb
0e
t  m

Et(qt+1h
0e
t ) + k
0
t

;
cet + it + i
0
t + qth
e
t + q
0
th
0e
t + rt 1b
e
t 1 + r
0
t 1b
0e
t 1 =
yet   wtlt   w0tl0t + qthet 1 + q0th0et 1 + bet + b0et :
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The objective function of MNEs and the problems of households are not changed.
For the frictionless model, the optimality conditions for capital holdings are given as:
1
cet
= Et

1
cet+1


yt+1
ket
+ 1  

;
1
c0et
= Et

1
c0et+1


y0t+1
k0et
+ 1  

:
For the model with the borrowing constraints, the optimality conditions for capital hold-
ings are:
1
cet
= Et

1
cet+1


yt+1
ket
+ 1  

+met ;
1
c0et
= Et

1
c0et+1


y0t+1
k0et
+ 1  

+m0et :
In the chapter, I exclude the bond transaction between home households and foreign
households in the model with the borrowing constraints. Thus, home households' budget
constraint is modied as follows:
ct + qtht + rt 1bt 1 = wtlt + qtht 1 + bt:
Proof of inefciency in the nancial friction model
In this section, I show that the steady state allocation of real estate in the model with
the borrowing constraints (but without capital) is inefcient. I show this by showing that
there is a Pareto improvement allocation.
To prove the claim, we need to derive steady state levels of output, real estate allocation
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and consumption. First, I retrieve the following steady state equations from above:
c
y
= (1  ) + m(
 1   1)
1    1;
he
h
=
(1  )
 (1  ) 
y
c
:
By these conditions, we can obtain the level of real estate holdings as:
he
h
=
(1  )
 (1  ) 
1
1
 2;
) (1 + 2)h = h;
) h = 1
1 + 2
h; he =
2
1 + 2
h: (c.1)
The steady state labor hours (see the ninth row of the steady state equations in the model
with the borrowing constraints) are given by:
l =
h
(1  )y
c
i 1

;
=)

(1  )
1
 1

: (c.2)
Combining (c.1) and (c.2) yields:
y = A

2
1 + 2
h
 
(1  )
1
 1 

;
c = 1y;
= A1

2
1 + 2
h
 
(1  )
1
 1 

:
Suppose a marginal unit of real estate is reallocated from home households to MNEs in
the steady state.
henew = h
e + dh; hnew = h  dh: (c.3)
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This reallocation changes two things. i) Output in home country increases by the mar-
ginal product of real estate. ii) Home households' utility decreases by the marginal utility
of housing service.86 Notice i) and ii) are measured by:
@y
@he
=
y
he
= A
"
2h
1 + 2

1
1  
1=# 1
;
@u
@h
=
 
h
=
 (1 + 2)
h
:
Suppose all the incremental income is distributed to home households. And suppose
home households consume all the incremental income and they do not change labor supply.
These imply neither the debt position of each agent nor the leisure of home households
changes. If, for home households, the gain from incremental consumption is higher than
the loss from giving up housing service, then the new allocation is a Pareto improvement:
all the agents are at least as better off as in the original steady state and home households
are strictly better off than in the original steady state.
The marginal utility of consumption of home households at the steady state is:
@u
@c
=
1
c
=
1
A1

2=(1 + 2) h

[(1  )=1]
1 

:
Hence, the gain from incremental consumption is:
@u
@c
 @y
@he
 dh = A

2=(1 + 2) h
 1
[(1  )=1](1 )=
A1

2=(1 + 2) h

[(1  )=1](1 )=
 dh
=
(1 + 2)
12h
 dh:
86I assume MNEs do not utilize incremental real estate as collateral of borrowing. This is not an op-
timal response of MNEs but it satises the borrowing constraints. Hence there is no problem in showing
inefciency.
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The loss from giving up the marginal unit of housing service is:
 @u
@h
 dh =   (1 + 2)h  dh:
The net change of home households' utility is:

@u
@c
@y
@he
  @u
@h

dh =

(1 + 2)
12h
   (1 + 2)h

dh
=


12
   

(1 + 2)
h
dh: (c.4)
Recall
2 =
(1  )
 (1  ) 
1
1
:
Then (c.4) is rewritten as:

@u
@c
@y
@he
  @u
@h

dh =

 (1  )
(1  )    

(1 + 2)
h
dh
=

(1  )
(1  )   1

 (1 + 2)
h
dh:
Notice (1  ) > (1  ) and  < 1: Then,

(1  )
(1  )   1

> 0 )
@u
@c
@y
@he
  @u
@h

dh =

(1  )
(1  )   1

 (1 + 2)
h
dh > 0:
In all, the allocation (c.3) and cnew = c+(@y=@he)dh is feasible. And the allocation
makes home households strictly better off while MNEs and foreign households are as better
off as in the original steady state. Thus, reallocating real estate from home households to
MNEs attains a Pareto improvement which implies the original steady state is inefcient.87
87Notice allocating all the incremental output, (@y=@he)  dh; to the households is not necessary. A
sufcient condition that home households are strictly better off is (1 )(1 ) > 1, where  is the share of
incremental output which is reallocated to home households.
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